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Abstract: On Jul 27, 2009 the European Commission (EC) issued its annual report, United States Barriers to
Trade and Investment Report for 2008, where it once again republished its complaint that "small business set-
aside schemes, exemplified by the Small Business Act of 1953," are discriminatory measures that "limit bidding
opportunities for EU (or European Union) contractors" in the US procurement market. As this Article
demonstrates, small business has long held a special place in the Western public procurement systems both in
Europe and in the US. Public authorities on both sides of the Atlantic use the demand created by government
contracts to stimulate competitive private entrepreneurship and greater economic development within their
borders. In 2003, both the US and the combined European economies had gross domestic products roughly





Full text: I. INTRODUCTION  
On July 27, 2009 the European Commission (EC) issued its annual report, United States Barriers to Trade and
Investment Report for 2008, where it once again republished its complaint that "small business set-aside
schemes, exemplified by the Small Business Act of 1953," are discriminatory measures that "limit bidding
opportunities for EU [or European Union] contractors" in the U.S. procurement market.1 The EC raised this
same concern in at least two preceding editions of this annual report.2 In light of these persistent complaints by
our trading partners, U.S. policymakers in Congress and the executive branch would be well-justified in
considering broad questions of comity, such as the extent to which the Europeans themselves have adopted
policies and practices that favor small EU firms in government procurement; the relative impact of these
practices on the entry of U.S. firms into the EU procurement system; the motives behind the U.S. and EU small
business preferences; the extent to which any EU small business practices are worth adopting in the United
States as part of procurement reforms; and implications of established small business preferences for future
transatlantic trade relations.  
As this Article demonstrates, small business has long held a special place in the Western public procurement
systems both in Europe and in the United States. Public authorities on both sides of the Atlantic use the
demand created by government contracts to stimulate competitive private entrepreneurship and greater
economic development within their borders. Indeed, the United States; the EU's predecessor (the European
Community); EU members Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom; and European Free Trade Area (EFTA) members Iceland,
Norway, and Switzerland are all signatories to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's
2000 Bologna Charter on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Policies. The Bologna Charter "recommend [s]
that in developing SME policies . . . SME participation in public R&D programs and procurement contracts
[should be] encouraged."3  
Throughout the twentieth and the early twenty-first centuries, the United States has been a global leader in
small business-friendly procurement policies. However, such policies also have seen increasing popularity with
individual European countries, in pan-European institutions such as the European Space Agency, and with the
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highest authorities of the European Union, including the European Defense Agency and the European
Commission itself. As it turns out, U.S. and European small business preferences in contracting are mainly
driven by economic and policy concerns unrelated to foreign trade, such as countering monopolistic practices in
one's domestic industrial base, stimulating innovation, remedying past racial discrimination, or promoting
employment in local distressed areas. To the extent that small business preferences are used to strengthen
domestic industry for international competitiveness, this rationale is generally recognized as legitimate by
European government authorities and learned commentators.  
In 2003, both the United States and the combined European economies had gross domestic products (GDPs)
roughly equal to $1 1 trillion.4 With admission of twelve new members since 2003, the EU now includes
twentyseven countries.5 The EU's GDP has further grown from $14.34 trillion in 2006, to $14.66 trillion in 2007,
and to an estimated $14.82 trillion in 2008.6 In the United States, the GDP has further grown from $1 3 .83
trillion in 2006, to $14.1 1 trillion in 2007, to an estimated $14.29 trillion in 2008. 7 Companies known in Europe
as small and medium enterprises ("SMEs") and known in the United States as small businesses or small
business concerns ("SBs" or "SBCs") account for approximately sixty-five percent of the European GDP and
forty-five percent of the U.S. GDR8 U.S. small businesses accounted for fifty percent of private, nonfarm GDP
from 1998 through 2004, a decline from fifty-eight percent in the 1950s.9 In the United States, small firms
represent over ninety-nine percent of all employers, provide over half the privatesector jobs, and generate over
two-thirds of new jobs annually.10 U.S. small business policies in favor of prime contracting resulted in contract
awards that created or retained 654,114 jobs in fiscal year 2008, an increase from 562,000 jobs in fiscal year
2005. n  
European SMEs appear to be almost twice as represented in the European procurement market as U.S. small
businesses are in the U.S. procurement market. European small firms received on average forty-two percent of
all prime contracting dollars subject to EU regulation in 2005,12 while U.S. small firms received slightly more
than twenty-three percent of federal prime contracting dollars for fiscal year 2005.13 Within EU Member States,
SME participation "rangebi] from 78% and 77% in Slovenia and Slovakia to 35% and 31% in France and the
U.K."14 These participation levels exceed U.S. participation levels by a magnitude of anywhere from about 50%
to almost 400%. The comparison is even less favorable to the U.S. procurement system once it is recognized
that contracts subject to European regulation must be large enough to exceed EU thresholds. Currently, for
central government entities, these thresholds are set at about euro125,000 for supplies and services, and
euro4.845 million for public works, dropping further to euro80,000 and euro1 million whenever requirements are
split into small lots, but increasing to euro193,000 for supplies and services procured by subnational and local
authorities.15 What's more, the share of U.S. small businesses in U.S. procurement spending has been on the
decrease to less than 2 1.5% in fiscal year 2008 and a slight increase in fiscal year 2009.16  
Nonetheless, the European Commission, the leadership of the European Parliament, and other European
authorities have been increasingly looking for ways to utilize the power of public procurement (representing
approximately sixteen percent of the European GDP) to harness its small business sector and to carry out
broader socioeconomic objectives.17 Because governments in the United States and Europe (including
individual European governments) are concerned with economic competitiveness and development, they
recognize the unique economic and social contributions of small business as well as the unique challenges
faced by small firms.  
Over time, all public authorities are eventually confronted with the question of the proper role of small business
in public procurement. Although the Government as a buyer takes on many attributes of commercial firms, the
activities of the Government in buying goods and services do not represent free market activities. The
Government is spending public funds for public purposes. As a result, the taxpayers through their elected
representatives (or, in the case of Europe, through national governments) may demand accountable decision
making in procurement and fair return in the form of work funded through government contracts. Often, the
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Government is buying the "public goods" that the market would not otherwise supply in the same way, the same
manner, or the same quantities the Government sets in response to public priorities.18 Further, while and, in
part, because the government buyer imposes significant regulatory compliance burdens and resembles a
monopsonist, the government procurement industry tends towards monopolistic or oligopolistic consolidation
and concentration.19 These factors bring additional influences to bear on the private markets, with the potential
to strongly encourage or strongly discourage economic activity by many private enterprises.20  
There are both numerous similarities and differences among the small business-specific procurement policies
developed by the U.S. Government and by the various levels of government in Europe. As shown below, these
policies are rooted in the peculiar public procurement systems created on both sides of the Atlantic and in the
specific economic, social, or other goals that public authorities hoped to accomplish. This Article will examine
small business procurement policies across several key considerations, including the overall policy framework,
definitions of small firms, creation of specialized institutions to assist small business with breaking into public
procurements, access of small firms to suitable contracts, increasing transparency, promotion of economic and
social sustainability, stimulation of innovation, and related considerations. Although attempts will be made to
make comparisons between policies that are representative of the U.S. approach and one or more European
approaches, this Article is not meant to provide a comprehensive review of small business procurement laws
and regulations in every U.S. government agency or in every European country. While the recently enacted
Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 directs major pro-competition, pro-accountability, and pro-integrity reforms in
U.S. small business procurement policy,21 it will take time for most of its provisions to be translated into federal
regulations and policies. In addition, the role of political considerations in developing small business
procurement policy is outside the scope of this Article.  
II. SMALL BUSINESS PROCUREMENT POLICY: GENERAL FRAMEWORK  
In order to understand the similarities and differences between the details of policies on small business
contracting in the United States and in Europe, it is necessary to start by examining the fundamental principles
that drive these policies. Once this is done, it becomes clear that fundamental small business contracting
principles in the United States are, by and large, mutually reinforcing. In Europe, fundamental SME contracting
principles are, by and large, in tension.  
A. The U.S. Approach: Maximum Practicable Opportunity to Ensure Fair Share  
The U.S. small business procurement policy is generally set in section 1 and other provisions of the Small
Business Act of 195322 as binding law. This law emphasizes "full and free competition" as the "essence of the
American economic system of private enterprise."23 The law notes that such unfettered competition is essential
for achievement of pro-competitive economic goals such as "free markets" and "free entry into business."24 The
Act also notes the social goals of increasing "opportunities for the expression and growth of personal initiative
and individual judgment" and the defense policy goal of strengthening "the security of this Nation" through
"preservation and expansion of such competition."25 The Act further directs the Federal Government "to use all
practical means and to take such actions as are necessary . . . [to] reduce the concentration of economic
resources and expand competition."26  
To implement these goals, the Act embraces two related principles to govern the awards of federal contracts
and subcontracts. These policy principles emphasize the need for fairness to small contractors, both from the
standpoint of acquisition planning, strategies, and process, as well as from the standpoint of measurable
outcomes and results.  
The first such principle is the principle of "maximum practicable opportunity" to participate in federal contracts
and subcontracts:  
It is the policy of the United States that small business concerns . . . shall have the maximum practicable
opportunity to participate in the performance of contracts let by any Federal agency, including contracts and
subcontracts for subsystems, assemblies, components, and related services for major systems.2'  
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The "maximum practicable opportunity" principle is generally implemented through process-type actions such
as developing procurement strategies, subcontracting plans, and award procedures; publicizing procurement
opportunities; providing small firms with information on procurement laws and regulations; breaking up large or
complex contracts; and reserving or setting procurement opportunities aside for small firms.28  
The second such principle is the principle of "fair proportion," set forth as follows:  
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as
is possible, the interests of small-business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure
that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts or subcontracts for property and services for the
Government (including but not limited to contracts or subcontracts for maintenance, repair, and construction) be
placed with small-business enterprises, to insure that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government property
be made to such enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the overall economy of the Nation.29  
The "fair proportion" principle is generally implemented through planning measures such as contracting and
subcontracting goals established by Congress, the president, federal buying agencies, and the Small Business
Administration, as well as through accountability reporting such as the annual Small Business Procurement
Scorecard.30  
In practice, these two principles and their implementing measures are often intertwined and conflated. As will be
discussed below, this is a distinctively American approach, as the Europeans historically have sought to
distinguish between measures assuring opportunity and measures assuring a certain participation share to their
SMEs. Examples of such conflation in the United States include agency-specific fair share goals and set-asides
of specific contracts or classes of contracts to achieve those goals.31 For instance, in interpreting the so-called
Rule of Two in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which requires agencies to set aside any contract
above $100,000 unless there is no reasonable expectation of receiving fair-priced offers from two or more small
businesses, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) explained that "the Rule of Two is intended to
implement the Small Business Act language in 15 U.S.C. §644(a) . . . requiring that small businesses receive a
'fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property and services for the Government' " or to support
national defense.32 In procurements that were purportedly exempt from the Small Business Act's set-aside
requirements by executive branch regulations, such as the Federal Supply Schedule task order competitions,
small business size can nonetheless be used as a significant evaluation factor on an order-by-order basis.33  
It must be noted that the U.S. small business procurement policy is a federal policy that exists within the
constitutional framework of separate state and federal sovereignties.34 For this reason, in the United States, the
states and the Federal Government maintain separate public procurement systems. Therefore, the U.S.
procurement system at the national level does not, in general, regulate procurements by the states. One notable
exception is small and minority business preferences in federally funded contracts awarded by states and local
governments under President Ronald W Reagan's Executive Order 12432, Minority Business Enterprise
Development.35 The most well known of such preferences is the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise ("DBE")
program of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA), which
promotes participation by small minority-owned and womenowned firms in federally funded highway projects by
requiring expenditure of at least ten percent of highway funds for projects with such firms.36  
B. The European Approach: Tension Between Fair Access, SME Competitiveness, and Fair Return  
In Europe, the small business policy - more accurately, SME policy - with regard to public procurement has
been undertaken both by the European Union government bodies as well as by national and local governments.
The European Commission restated its historic approach to small business procurement as follows:  
Small and medium-sized enterprises are a unique source of innovation and competition in the internal market
and account for 99.8% of the total number of EU enterprises. The European Commission has always paid
particular attention to them. By facilitating their access to procurement opportunities, EU procurement policy
allows those firms to strengthen their competitiveness and enables them to contribute more towards growth,
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employment, and competitiveness of the European economy. Commission action has mainly been focused on
creating a level playing field where bids from firms, whatever their size or origin, have similar chances of
success. Since the early 1990s, measures have been focused specifically on SME's needs in terms of
simplification, information, services support, and promoting cooperation between SMEs on contracts.37  
In 2000, the European Council set in motion a long-term reform of procurement and other policies throughout
EU Member States by adopting The European Charter for Small Enterprises ("European Charter").38 The
European Charter directed the EC and Member States to "pursue the reforms underway aiming at the
completion in the Union of a true internal market, user-friendly for small business, in critical areas for
development of small businesses including . . . public procurement."39  
Historically, European efforts to promote small business procurements have been subject to a number of legal
constraints. Arguably, these constraints stemmed primarily from various provisions of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community ("EC Treaty"), now called the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union,40 and of the
procurement directives adopted and applied by the European Parliament and Council with Commission
involvement.41 The EC Treaty "covers all public-sector procurement contracts with the European Community,
no matter what their value. The EC Treaty sets down principles to prevent discrimination against firms from any
Member State."42 Contracts above various monetary thresholds established by the European Commission are
regulated by the Commission's procurement directives. Specifically, the Treaty-based constraints are known as
the "four freedoms:"  
Article 6 (prohibiting discrimination on grounds of nationality), Article 30 (free movement of goods), Article 48
(free movement of workers), and Articles 52 and 59 (freedom to provide services and the freedom of
establishment). These provisions prohibit not only direct discrimination on the basis of nationality, but also
treatment by a Member State which in effect discriminates against, or does not provide equal treatment to, a
person or entity from another Member State. The importance of these provisions is that they provide a binding
standard against which to consider all public procurement decisions by public contracting authorities.43  
For instance, in 1992 and 1993, the European Court of Justice invoked these "four freedoms" in two cases,
Commission of European Communities v. Italian Republic^ and Commission of European Communities v.
Denmark,^ to invalidate national and local percentage-of-work, main-office-location, labor, materials, goods, and
equipment preferences that effectively favored or could have favored local SMEs.  
European legal scholars disagree on whether these principles, as interpreted by the European Court of Justice
and the European Commission, would extend to situations where preferences are available to SMEs without
facial or as-applied discrimination on the basis of nationality. However, the weight of authority and logic appears
to fall on the side favoring SME preferences as compatible with the EC Treaty. Perhaps the strongest European
Court of Justice precedent directly supporting SME set-asides and preferences is Commission of European
Communities v. French Republic?6 which validated mandatory SME participation on bidding teams imposed in
order to reduce local unemployment.  
The European Commission's procurement directives further implement the Treaty by establishing "procedural
and substantive requirements to those public contracts above a certain value."47 The EC Treaty and the
European Commission directives have provided the overall framework for small business procurement policies
of the Member States and their political subdivisions.  
Over the last five years, European authorities attempted to minimize Treaty-based and policy-based constraints
by issuing at least two legally binding directives that expressly authorize and direct various forms of targeted
procurement assistance to SMEs: Directive 2004/18/EC of March 31, 2004, On the Coordination of Procedures
for the Award of Public Works Contracts, Public Supply Contracts, and Public Service Contracts ("Public
Procurement Directive" or "Classic Directive"),48 and Directive 2009/81/EC of July 13, 2009, On the
Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Certain Works Contracts, Supply Contracts, and Service Contracts
by Contracting Authorities or Entities in the Fields of Defense and Security, and Amending Directives
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2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC ("Defense Procurement Directive").49 EU Member States are required to achieve
compliance with the Public Procurement Directive by January 3 1, 2006, 50 and with the Defense Procurement
Directive by August 2 1, 201 1.51 Both directives recognize that such assistance would be appropriate and
desirable. In particular, the Defense Procurement Directive called on Member States to limit exclusions of
defense items from European Commission directives and rules as authorized under article 296(l)(b) of the
Treaty52 in the "context" of promoting the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base, including
support for SME defense suppliers.53  
The Public Procurement Directive "is based on [European] Court of Justice case law, in particular case law on
award criteria, which clarifies the possibilities for the contracting authorities to meet the needs of the public
concerned, including in the environmental and/or social area, provided that such criteria are linked to the subject
matter of the contract, do not confer an unrestricted freedom of choice on the contracting authority, are
expressly mentioned, and comply with fundamental principles" of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community such as free movement of goods, free establishment of business, equal treatment,
nondiscrimination, proportionality, and transparency54 The Classic Directive recognized that social
considerations, including SME participation, can be made part of the contracting process in two circumstances.
The first circumstance involves including social consideration as part of award criteria when awards are made
on the "most economically advantageous tender," or best value for money, basis.55 The second circumstance
includes imposition of social contract performance conditions to which contractors must agree regardless of
whether the award is made on the lowest price basis or the most economically advantageous tender/best value
basis.36  
The Defense Procurement Directive goes even farther than the Public Procurement Directive in its support for
SME procurement assistance by tying the support for SMEs to competitiveness and national security goals:  
Member States agree on the need to foster, develop and sustain a European Defence Technological and
Industrial Base that is capability driven, competent and competitive. In order to achieve this objective, Member
States may use different tools, in conformity with Community law, aiming at a truly European defence
equipment market and a level playing field at both European and global levels. They should also contribute to
the in-depth development of the diversity of the European defense -related supplier base, in particular by
supporting the involvement of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and non-traditional suppliers in the
European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, fostering industrial cooperation and promoting efficient
and responsive lower tier suppliers. . . . The Commission should carry out a periodic assessment to examine
whether the defense equipment market is functioning in an open, transparent and competitive way, including the
impact of this Directive on the market, for example on involvement of SMEs."  
The EC echoes the same themes in its policies. On June 25, 2008, the EC issued Commission Communication
"Think Small First": A "Small Business Act" for Europe,58 which provides a set often principles to assist SMEs.
One of these principles calls on European authorities to "adapt public policy tools to SME needs ... [to facilitate]
SMEs' participation in public procurement procedures . . . [and] make better use of the possibilities offered by . .
. State Aid ... for SMEs."59 As part of this effort, EC Commission Staff published a voluntary European Code of
Best Practices Facilitating Access of SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts ("European Code of Best
Practices").60 The European Code of Best Practices states that "increased involvement of SMEs into public
purchasing will result in higher competition for public contracts, leading to better value for money for contracting
authorities. In addition to this, more competitive and transparent public procurement practices will allow SMEs to
unlock their growth and innovation potential with a positive impact on the European economy."61 The European
Code of Best Practices lists solutions to assist small businesses with the following issues:  
overcoming difficulties relating to the size of the contracts; ensuring access to relevant information; improving
quality and understanding of the information provided; settling proportionate qualification levels and financial
requirements; alleviating the administrative burden; putting more emphasis on value for money rather than
03 May 2016 Page 6 of 54 ProQuest
price; giving sufficient time to draw up tenders; and ensuring payments on time.62  
Similar policies or practices - some described in the European Code - have been adopted by EU Member State
governments, EU agencies such as the European Defense Agency ("EDA"), and non-EU organizations such as
the European Space Agency ("ESA").63 For instance, in the United Kingdom, "[t]he Government's policy on
SMEs is to encourage and support these organisations to compete for public sector contracts where this is
consistent with the value for money policy of the UK regulations, EU Treaty principles, and EU procurement
directives."64 InJuIy 2009, the Irish Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment adopted a report on
SME procurement assistance stating that "increased involvement of SMEs . . . leads to better value for
money"65 Procurement policies providing various supports for SMEs either directly or indirectly can be found
both in long-term EU Member States, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy, and in new
Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, such as Bulgaria or Estonia.66  
Indeed, support for SMEs appears inherent in procurements conducted by Europe-wide defense and space
structures such as the EDA, its predecessor the Western European Armaments Group ("WEAG"), and the ESA.
Such support is driven by a comprehensive European industrial base development policy based on the principle
oí juste retour or "fair return," based on national investment in procurements, and its more recent formulation
known as the principle of "mutual benefit."67 The principle of fair return resembles national earmarking and "can
be described as the equitable industrial return that states require for their domestic industries as a result of the
states' participation to a particular collaborative program. The principle is considered important for countries with
small or medium sized defence industries because it secures the involvement of their domestic firms in the
defence procurement market."68 Its more recent formulation, the principle of mutual benefit, "reflects the idea
that in order for the establishment of a European Defense Equipment Market to be meaningful the participation
of the largest possible majority of Member States is needed. In particular the aforementioned principle tries to
bring on board those Member States which have small and medium-sized defense industries."69 Arguably, the
latter formulation targets SMEs from all EU countries, signifying a transition in defense industrial policy from the
principle oí juste retour towards support for SMEs.70 Specifically, the EDA on May 15, 2006, adopted the Code
of Best Practices in the Supply Chain ("CoBPSC") in order to ensure "fair opportunities ... for small- and
mediumsize enterprises" and "to promote opportunities, where competition is efficient, practical, and
economically or technologically appropriate on a level playing-field basis for qualified and competent suppliers
(both in-house and external), including SMEs."71 This code is enforced through the reciprocity of Member
States. Another foundational EDA policy document, A Strategy for the European Defense Technological and
Industrial Base ("EDTIB"), states:  
We know that our vision of a healthy, competitive and integrated future EDTIB will not be realised if our market-
opening efforts are perceived to be simply a bonanza for the large prime contractors. With industry's active
cooperation, we need to drive the benefits of competition down the supply chain - so that excellent second- and
third-tier companies, often SMEs (with their typical flexibility and capacity to innovate), are able to prosper in a
European scale of market. This makes economic as well as political sense. . . .71  
At the European Space Agency, the policy of assisting SME contractors is even older. "During the March 1997
meeting of the ESA Council, Ministers of ESAMember States called upon the Director General of ESA to
reserve a special place for SMEs. The objective is to guarantee them a share in the Agency's technological
activities, and to facilitate their access to technical facilities and tools."73 Thus, European SME policies
generally address both the issue of opportunity to compete and, to a lesser extent, the issue of share of
participation in public procurement through reservation of certain procurement opportunities at the prime
contracting and subcontracting levels for SMEs.74  
C. Comparison  
Both the United States and Europe at the EU and Europe-wide agency level have well-established,
comprehensive programs and policies on small business procurement assistance, and such policies are being
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rapidly implemented among the European Member States. However, the U.S. policies and programs are older
and better established than the European ones. While the U.S. assistance measures for small contractors are
focused on both the opportunity to participate (such as ensuring a transparent procurement process, providing
advance notice of procurement opportunities, simplifying qualifications to bid, or reducing contract sizes) and
the actual fair share of participation, the European assistance measures currently in place are focused more on
the opportunity to participate. This, however, is changing as European assistance is becoming more focused on
measurable, identifiable participation outcomes such as the extent of participation of SMEs in specific
contracts.75 Although Europe historically has not required or encouraged set-asides to the same extent as the
United States, European policies and practices effectively include SME participation as an element of best
value. In this way, the European approach is similar to the significant evaluation factor approach in U.S. Federal
Supply Schedule procurements. This approach creates uncertainty as to whether SME participation will, at the
end, carry the day and drive the award of a specific contract. The European approach of requiring SME
participation as a contract performance condition also introduces uncertainty, as such participation requirement
can vary contract-by-contract. Both these approaches also convey the appearance of a procurement system
free of SME preferences, when this is not the case. Nonetheless, assuming EU states will be following the EC
directives on public and defense procurement, it is likely that civilian and defense projects will be steered to
European SMEs on an even greater scale.  
III. DEFINING SMALL BUSINESS ENTERPRISES  
One clear and obvious indication of targeted policies to assist small businesses in government contracting is an
official, legally binding definition of a small business for government procurement purposes. Both European and
U.S. authorities have adopted such definitions. These definitions include criteria that are specific to certain
jurisdictions, contracts, or agencies, as well as criteria that are generally applicable to the procurement system
at large.  
A. The U.S. Approach: An Industry-Sensitive Definition Framework  
The United States traditionally has eschewed a one-size-fits-all approach to defining what would be a small
business for purposes of government contracting. Instead, the United States has generally taken into account
industryspecific trends and conditions. In the Small Business Act, Congress provided that "a small business
concern . . . shall be deemed to be one which is independently owned and operated and which is not dominant
in its field of operation."76 Further, Congress gave the SBA the authority to specify, "in addition to the [se]
criteria, detailed definitions or standards by which a business concern may be determined to be a small
business concern for the purposes [of the Small Business Act] or any other Act."77 The SBA's criteria "may
utilize number of employees, dollar volume of business, net worth, a combination thereof, or other appropriate
factors," but the SBA "shall ensure that the size standard varies from industry to industry to the extent
necessary to reflect differing characteristics of the various industries and consider other factors determined to
be relevant by the [SBA] Administrator."78 The Small Business Act makes it "the duty" of the SBA "to determine
within any industry the concerns, firms, persons, corporations, partnerships, cooperatives, or other business
enterprises which are to be designated 'small-business concerns'" and requires the SBA Administrator to issue
upon request a revocable certificate that a concern is a small business.'9 Congress has generally refrained from
establishing specific size standards by statute.80 The SBA has promulgated Small Business Size Regulations
pursuant to this authority at 13 CER. Part 121.  
In the United States, size standards for government procurement purposes have changed over the years.
According to the late U.S. Senator Leverett Saltonstall, a member of congressional leadership in the 1950s,81
Congress originally passed a small business definition for defense procurement purposes in the Selective
Service Act of 1940, imposing a size cap of "500 employees, including affiliated."82 Congress, however, has
frequently criticized the SBAs 500-person size cap applicable to all federal contracts as too inflexible and
unresponsive to the realities of the marketplace.83  
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Since 1997, the SBA has relied on the North American Industrial Classification System ("NAICS") to determine
the type of industry in which a company is participating. NAICS was developed to facilitate better comparisons
among industries of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. According to the SBAs Guide to Size Standards,
the SBA "has established two widely used size standards: 500-employees for most manufacturing and mining
industries and $7.0 million in average annual receipts for most nonmanufacturing industries. However, many
exceptions exist."84 Size standards generally apply to procurement as well as nonprocurement assistance.
Common industryspecific size standards include size standards ranging from $7 million to $20 million in
average annual receipts for various industries related to construction and dredging; size standards capped at
750, 1,000, or 1,500 employees for certain manufacturing industries not subject to the 500-employee size
standard; a 500-employee size standard for nonservice mining industries; size standards ranging from $7
million to $29 million in average annual receipts for retail industries; size standards ranging from $7 million to
$35.5 million in average annual receipts for most service industries; a 500-employee size standard and a
generally applicable requirement for wholesale trade industries that do function in the financial sector that items
supplied be a product of a U.S. small domestic manufacturer.81 Other industries such as finance, insurance,
transportation, and electricity have size standards with "no common pattern" for industry groups.86 In addition,
a few industries have additional regulatory conditions for purposes of government procurement programs, such
as the 125,000 barrels per calendar day total operable atmospheric crude oil distillation capacity for petroleum
refineries.87 For purposes of pro-innovation setaside competitions under the Small Business Innovation
Research Program ("SBIR") and the Small Business Technology Transfer Program, the size standard is 500
employees regardless of the industry in which the research and development ("R&D") work is to be
conducted.88 For purposes of the Very Small Business ("VSB") Set-Aside Pilot Program in existence between
1994 and 2003, the size standard was fifteen employees or less and average annual revenues of $1 million or
less.89 Detailed size standards are published in the SBA's regulations and its Table of Small Business Size
Standards; they have the force and effect of law.90 To accommodate the diversity of industries and programs,
size standards have become rather complex: the SBA Table goes on for twenty-five pages setting forth size
standards in well over a thousand industry categories,91 while the SBA's Guide to Size Standards goes on for
another seventeen pages.92  
A business concern may be small in one industry category and yet large in another. Under SBA regulations,
Contracting Officers are responsible for choosing the NAICS code that best describes the "principal purpose" of
the product or service acquired.93 The basis for this decision is subject to a complex six- factor test, which
includes (1) "industry descriptions" in the NAICS Manual, (2) description of the product or service in solicitation
documents, (3) "value and importance" of the procurement's components, (4) functions of products and services
procured, (5) prior procurement classifications in similar purchases, and (6) the purposes of the Small Business
Act.94 A procurement is usually classified according to the component that accounts for the greatest
percentage of contract value. Despite their complexity, the U.S. small business size definitions are publicly
available and generally applicable to contracts and subcontracts across federal agencies.  
SBAs employee-based caps are calculated prior to each representation or certification of small business size
based on the average number of employees for each pay period "over the preceding 12 months."95 Part-time or
temporary employees count the same as full-time employees.96 Total average employees of all entities
considered affiliated with the enterprise that have been employed by those affiliates over the preceding twelve-
month period (even if affiliation arose more recently) are included in the count.97 There is no official definition of
a "medium-sized business" in the United States for procurement purposes.98  
In addition to assuring predictability and transparency in small business definitions, Congress and the SBA have
established a panoply of safeguards to protect the U.S. small business size definitions from fraud and
manipulation. These safeguards include not only publicly available and legally binding definitions, but also the
process to appeal the NAICS designations for individual contracts;99 the process to protest to the SBA a
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company's representation that it is a small business;100 the regulations concerning affiliation with large
businesses and ostensible subcontracting with large businesses;101 regulations concerning recertification of a
former small business that became too large through growth, mergers, or acquisitions;102 prohibition on
subcontracting the majority of the work on small business set-asides to large businesses, known as "limitations
on subcontracting";103 and criminal and civil penalties for misrepresentation of small business size.104
Individual federal agencies generally cannot, on their own, adjust small business size or status requirements or
safeguards such as the limitation on subcontracting for individual contracts.105  
Perhaps the most important policy safeguards against manipulation of small business definitions in the U.S.
procurement system are the SBA's rules limiting affiliation of small business concerns with other businesses. In
particular, the SBA affiliation regulations at 13 CER. §121.103 provide that "concerns and entities are affiliates
of the other when one controls or has the power to control the other, or a third party or parties controls or has
[sic] the power to control both. It does not matter whether control is exercised, as long as the power to control
exists."106 Affiliation is determined based on totality-of-thecircumstances basis; relevant factors include not
only ownership, but also management, prior relationships, indirect ties through third parties, and contractual
relationships.107 Affiliation also may be found based on negative control, which includes "instances where a
minority shareholder has the ability, under the concern's charter, bylaws, or shareholder's [sic] agreement, to
prevent a quorum or otherwise block action by the board of directors or shareholders."108 Affiliation may be
found even where "no single factor" by itself would create affiliation.109 Thus, affiliation restrictions are
intentionally broad in order to serve as catchall for schemes to manipulate small business programs.  
B. The European Approach: A User-Friendly Definition Framework  
European nations have had a variety of SME size standards or definitions. However, within the EU framework,
the European Commission is responsible for promulgating a definition applicable to EU activities. The
Commission's definitions of SMEs are not legally binding on Member States.110 Prior to 1996, the EU SME
definition corresponded to the traditional U.S. size standard cap of 500 employees.111 However, since 1996,
the Commission has adopted two recommendations concerning SME definitions: Commission
Recommendation 96/2 80/EC of April 3, 1996, and Commission Recommendation 2 003/3 61/EC of May 6,
2003, which became effective on January 1, 2005. 112 The latest definition applies to EU agencies and
programs, such as the EDA, and EU Members States are invited to use it.113 ESA also follows this
definition.114 The EU definitions also are used in the European Economic Area ("EEA"), for example, in
Switzerland.113  
The 2003 EC Recommendation establishes "staff headcounts and financial ceilings" to determine what
constitutes a "micro, small and medium sized enterprise."116 SMEs are "made up of enterprises which employ
fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding euro50 million, and/or an annual
balance sheet total not exceeding euro43 million."117 Small enterprises are those that employ less than fifty
persons, with an annual turnover and/or balance sheet not exceeding euro10 million.118 Microenterprises are
those that employ less than ten people, with an annual turnover and/or balance sheet total not exceeding euro2
million.119 According to the European Central Bank's 2009 data, this represents dollar-based ceilings worth
approximately $71 million in annual turnover and/or an annual balance sheet worth approximately $61 million
for SMEs, $14 million for small enterprises, and $3 million for microenterprises.120 According to the New SME
Definition User Guide, "annual turnover is determined by calculating the income that your enterprise received
during the year in question for sales and services after all rebates have been paid out," not including value-
added and other indirect taxes, while "the annual balance sheet refers to the value of your company's
assets."121 Employees are calculated in "annual work units" ("AWUs"), a concept that parallels the American
concept of full-time equivalents ("FTEs").122 As a result, part-time and seasonal workers are included in the
calculation as parts of AWUs. However, time spent on paternity or maternity leave is not counted. Employees,
active partners, managing owners, and employees of subordinate enterprises who are considered employees
03 May 2016 Page 10 of 54 ProQuest
under national laws of EUMember States also are included in the AWU calculation. On the other hand,
apprentices or vocational training students are not included in the count.123  
It is important to note that not all EU Member States follow the EC definition. For instance, the United Kingdom,
a country with a large and well-established procurement system, currently appears to target its procurement
assistance "for small and medium-sized enterprises . . . with up to 500 employees."124  
The 2003 EU definition contains several protections against manipulation and circumvention by large
businesses. However, in comparison to the 1996 EU definition, these protections have been relaxed in order to
enable companies to attract outside financing.125 Anti-manipulation and anti-circumvention measures under the
2003 definition include rules governing affiliation with SMEs of other business entities, natural persons,
universities, venture capitalists and business angels, and even government authorities. The affiliation rules draw
a distinction between three types of SMEs: autonomous, partner, and linked enterprises.  
Separately, the European Code of Best Practices encourages SMEs to invoke article 47(2) of the Public
Procurement Directive, which authorizes contractors "where appropriate and for a particular contract, [to] rely on
the capacities of other entities, regardless of the legal nature of the links it has with them."126 This policy could
be viewed as authorizing ostensible subcontractortype arrangements with large businesses.  
Further, the apparent clarity and predictability of the EU definition is obviated by the absence of a mandatory
size enforcement process and by the language granting safe harbor to companies declaring themselves SMEs
"even if the capital is spread in such a way that it is not possible to determine by whom it is held."127 The EC
permits such a company to "declare in good faith that it can legitimately presume that it is not owned as to 25%
or more by one enterprise or jointly by enterprises linked to another."128 Such declarations, however, may be
challenged in the course of "check and investigations" under separate EU or Member State laws or rules.129  
C. Comparison  
In terms of public policy objectives, Europe appears to emphasize userfriendliness, clarity, and simplicity in its
SME definitions. This is particularly true with regards to concerns related to affiliation with other entities: a
European contracting official or SME owner, by consulting The New SME Definition Guide,"0 could easily
determine whether or not an enterprise in question is a large business by affiliation. This is a substantial
advantage in the administration of small business assistance measures. However, it would be hard to argue that
this one-size-fits-all approach is a genuine reflection of conditions in the industries in which small firms have to
compete. Accordingly, SME-specific assistance in Europe could simultaneously be denied to deserving firms in
some industries and extended to firms that would be considered large under an industry-specific analysis in
other industries. On the other hand, the complexity of the U.S. small business size standards is somewhat of a
necessary evil because it reflects considerations of industryspecific conditions and fair competition among
similarly situated firms in the same industries.  
In terms of the absolute measures of size, the competitive impact of assistance based on these definitions is
hard to estimate across the board. For example, the United Kngdom apparently still uses the 500-employee
definition in some circumstances,131 equivalent to the traditional American standard. The EU has larger size
caps across all industries in general, while the United States has larger overall size caps in some of its
industries. Thus, although competitive impact will be determined on an industry-by-industry basis, U.S. services
firms would be generally disadvantaged by the EU SME definition while U.S. manufacturers should be favored
by it.  
Moreover, the European definition favors jobs creation more than the U.S. definition. This is because the
underlying mathematics used in calculating employee-based size caps is not the same across the Atlantic. One
AWU/ FTE-based European employee can equal several U.S. employees based on counting rules in the SBA
regulations.132 As a result, a U.S. R&D or manufacturing firm with 100 full-time employees and another 600
employees working only a quarter of an FTE each would be the economic equivalent of a European enterprise
employing 250 AWU employees. As a matter of SBA regulations, such U.S. firms would bust even the
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supposedly higher 500employee U.S. size standards for R&D or manufacturers by 200 employees, would be
branded as large businesses, and would be denied procurement assistance or preferences under the Small
Business Act.133 The U.S. firm appears to be a giant almost three times larger than the European firm, but this
appearance is false. In reality, the two firms have the same size as measured by full-time employment. Had
such U.S. firm relocated to Europe, it would still have qualified for SME-specific procurement measures. By
using the AWU/ FTE method, Europeans enable their SMEs to create more jobs than U.S. firms before the
European SMEs are forced to compete as large businesses.  
The supposed advantages for U.S. small businesses in industries with relatively high size standards lose their
luster even more once the U.S. and the EU definitions for protections against manipulation and fraud are
considered. In comparison with the U.S. small business size standard system, the European definition does not
sufficiently protect independence of ownership or operation of SMEs, and is highly vulnerable to fraud and
manipulation by large businesses or investor government agencies. First, the European affiliation and anti-
circumvention rules plainly allow companies that are majorityowned by large businesses and government
agencies to qualify as autonomous SMEs as long as each such investor owned less than twenty-five
percent.134 Indeed, based on examples throughout The New SME Definition Guide,m an SME would be
considered merely partnered if a large business owned just under fifty percent and two other large businesses
owned between twenty and twenty-five percent each. Second, negative control affiliation is not recognized
under the EU definition; instead, the EU definition contains what appears to be a legal presumption that minority
shareholders do not control an SME.136 These policies further tilt the competitive field towards Europe over the
United States by opening the doors to large business manipulation of European SME procurement assistance
measures. Third, the European affiliation rules for partner enterprises exclude the majority of their employees
from the count of the enterprise claiming SME status.137 The integrity of the definition is stronger in the United
States, where SBA affiliation rules require adding all employees of all affiliated firms.138 Fourth, the EC
imposes no requirements that an SME perform the majority of the work on a public contract or subcontract, or
provide supplies manufactured by an SME. In addition, the EC does not require a formal size protest
mechanism, companies may declare their SME status claiming "in good faith" lack of knowledge of their own
ownership, and the 2003 EC Recommendation says nothing about whether the European authorities would
aggressively pursue criminal or civil fraud enforcement of SME size fraud.139  
Thus, from the U.S. perspective, there is a real risk that European programs for SMEs, such as RcScD set-
asides, will operate as mere domestic preferences for European firms, regardless of size.  
IV CREATION OF SMALL BUSINESS PROCUREMENT ASSISTANCE AGENCIES  
To assist small firms with accessing public procurement markets, both European and U.S. authorities created
specialized government institutions. These institutions not only provide financing and technical assistance
counseling to the private sector, but they also engage their sister agencies in efforts to expand procurement
opportunities to small firms. However, these institutions appear to be more independent in the United States.  
A. The U.S. Approach: An Independent, Central Small Business Advocate and Regulator  
An independent federal agency with presidentially appointed, Senateconfirmed administrator and deputy
administrator, the SBA "shall be under the general direction and supervision of the President and shall not be
affiliated with or be within any other agency or department of the Federal Government."140 To further enhance
the SBA's independent voice with regards to complaints of small businesses, regulatory relief, and studies of
small business programs (including government contracting programs), Congress created within the SBA a
special Office of Advocacy led by the presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed chief counsel for advocacy141
Nonetheless, the SBA has been endowed with powers not only to engage in cooperative intergovernmental
efforts,142 but also to promulgate regulations binding on private individuals and other agencies.143 The SBA
has issued numerous regulations concerning small business contracting and subcontracting.144  
In addition, the SBA has been directed by the Small Business Act145 to designate Procurement Center
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Representatives ("PCRs") (as well as Breakout Procurement Center Representatives ("BPCRs") and other
personnel) for oversight of major buying activities of the Government, including  
reviewing proposed acquisitions and recommending alternative procurement strategies; identifying qualified
small business sources; reviewing subcontracting plans; conducting reviews of the contracting office to ensure
compliance with small business policies; counseling small businesses; and sponsoring and participating in
conferences and training designed to increase small business opportunities.146  
To emphasize the importance of advocacy for small business within government agencies, the Small Business
Act also directed that each federal agency with contracting authority must establish the Office of Small and
Disadvantaged Business Utilization ("OSDBU"), with the director reporting to the head of the agency147
OSDBUs are "responsible for ensuring that small businesses have the maximum practicable opportunity to
participate in the performance of federal contracts as both prime contractors and subcontractors."148 OSDBU
offices are required by law to closely work with the SBA.149 Various agency-specific authorities generally
enhance the policies of the Small Business Act.  
Finally, small business procurement initiatives are promoted and supported through the White House Office of
Federal Procurement Policy ("OFPP"). The OFPP is charged by its authorizing statute with developing policies
that would help federal agencies achieve their small business goals and would ensure "maximum practicable
opportunities" for small business participation in small-dollar procurements.150  
B. The European Approach: Centralized Advocacy, Varied National Implementation  
European efforts to create public authorities specifically charged with directing various forms of procurement
assistance have been relatively recent - but they are at least as comprehensive as similar efforts in America, if
not more. In Europe, small business procurement policies are developed and implemented at three different
levels: the European Union level; the level of non-EU European agencies or institutions; and the level of
individual EU members, including both national and subnational authorities.151 At the EU level, small business
procurement policy is handled by the European Commission, including its Enterprise &Industry ("EI")
Directorate-General, the EDA, and the Community Research &Development Information Service
("CORDIS").152 The EI Directorate-General is responsible for initiatives to support the growth and development
of SMEs. Its comprehensive efforts for small business procurement began with the Green Paper, Public
Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way Forward, published on November 27, 1996.153
Following the paper's publication, the EC took official action on small business procurement by issuing
Commission Communication COM (98) 143 final, Public Procurement in the European Union, on March 11,
1998.154 However, the European-level activities to promote small business procurement have been historically
limited to promoting regulatory simplification and fairness in cross-border trade.155  
To enhance SME participation in policymaking at the EU level, the EC created a special position of SME Envoy
with the rank of the Deputy DirectorGeneral of the EC Directorate-General of Enterprise and Industry. The SME
Envoy promotes the "Think Small First" strategies for public procurement, state aid to enterprises, and R&D
activities (embodied in a guidebook by the same title) in activities of EU and Member State agencies.156  
European agencies and institutions that are, strictly speaking, not part of the EU structure also have created or
adopted procurement policies in support of SMEs. One example is the ESA, which is an international
organization dedicated "to the development of Europe's space capability"157 as well as to "political efforts to
forge a united Europe"158 and to "building Europe as a politicai entity."159 The ESA's ruling Council includes
eighteen Member States: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom; Canada participates in some projects under a Cooperation Agreement.160 Estonia, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and Slovenia participate in ESA activities under a special agreement for European countries.161 The
ESA created an SME Policy Office that "manages and coordinates, ESA-wide, application of the SME Policy"
and "put in place a number of measures to reinforce the technical capabilities and sustainability of high
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technology SMEs in order to facilitate their involvement in ESA activities" such as set-asides and subcontracting
clauses.162  
The European Free Trade Association ("EFTA") undertook a somewhat different approach. There, the relatively
generalist EFTA Surveillance Authority monitors SME-specific assistance measures.163 Asimilar approach -
assigning SME responsibilities to a generalist organization - is undertaken by the European Defense Agency.
SME assistance is the focus of the Industry and Market Directorate as part of its responsibilities for
enhancement of the European defense industrial base.164  
In light of both the EU's traditionally limited involvement in small business procurement and the EU's recent
drive to increase such involvement, EU nations and their subnational units created their own individual small
business procurement authorities. For instance, procurement-related assistance to SMEs in the United Kingdom
is a responsibility of both the Small Business Service ("SBS") within the Department of Trade and Industry
(currently the Department of Business, Innovation, and Skills), and its Office of Government Commerce ("OGC")
within the Department of the Treasury.165 The mission of the SBS, created in 2000, is to facilitate business
start-ups and development, while the OGC strives "to achieve effective competition for government business by
simplifying access to the government market place."166  
C. Comparison  
Formal offices or agencies responsible for small business procurement assistance have been widely
established in the United States and in Europe. U.S. arrangements for such offices have emphasized their
specialization in matters related to small business, relative independence, direct reporting to top decision
makers such as the president or agency secretaries, and oversight powers. European arrangements, on the
other hand, have emphasized the substantive relationship between small business procurement assistance and
other policies, such as innovation or development of domestic industries. Independence and direct reporting to
top leadership have not been emphasized. As a result, European small business programs have the potential to
be driven by non-small business concerns.  
V. AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE CONTRACTS  
In the context of public procurement, one of the threshold issues for small businesses is the ability to access
contracts suitable to the business capabilities of such enterprises. It goes without saying that such work must
be, in fact, available. Whether suitable work is available depends on the size or monetary value of contracts,
and, to a lesser extent, on the complexity of geographic and performance requirements. Both U.S. and
European authorities have pursued limitations on contract awards in order to assure their suitability for small
firms. These approaches have a common "good government" concern over fairness and equality of competition,
but there are also many differences.  
A. The U.S. Approach: Addressing Contract Bundling and Consolidation  
As early as the 1940s and 50s, congressional leadership recognized that contract bundling, or "the size of
various procurements," was an obstacle to the entry of small firms into the federal market.167 Today, FAR Part
19 directs Contracting Officers to ensure equitable opportunity for small firms by dividing "proposed acquisitions
of supplies and services (except construction) into reasonably small lots (not less than economic production
runs) to permit offers on quantities less than the total requirement."168  
Legislative policy aimed at reducing contract bundling was, in effect, enacted into law by the Competition in
Contracting Act ("CICA") of 1984.169 Interpreting CICA, the comptroller general opined that bundling contract
requirements in excess of the agency's minimum needs to have the requirements performed together violated
CICA's requirement for full and open competition.170 CICA anti-bundling protections apply to both large and
small firms, and bundling in violation of CICA is impermissible even if the requirements are bundled in a small
business set-aside contract that excludes smaller small businesses (qualified under a NAICS code with a
smaller size standard cap) in favor of larger small businesses (qualified under a NAICS code with a larger size
standard cap).171  
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Finally, congressional anti-bundling policy was explicitly enacted into law by the Small Business Reauthorization
Act of 1997. 172 The Small Business Act defines contract bundling to mean "consolidating two or more
procurement requirements for goods or services previously provided or performed under separate, smaller
contracts, in a solicitation of offers for a single contract that is unlikely to be suitable for award to small
business."173  
The Act calls on agencies to pay particular attention to factors "that might cause unsuitability for award to small
business," such as "the diversity, size, or specialized nature" of performance called for in the contract, the total
dollar value of the contract, the geographic spread of performance, or a combination of these factors.174 To
reduce contract bundling and the resulting denial of opportunities for small firms, the Act directs each federal
agency, to the maximum extent practicable, to "(1) structure contracting requirements to facilitate competition by
and among small business concerns, taking all reasonable steps to eliminate obstacles to their participation;
and (2) avoid unnecessary and unjustified bundling of contract requirements that may preclude small business
participation in procurements as prime contractors."175 Contracts set aside for small businesses are not
considered bundled under the Small Business Act.  
In 2002, then-President George W Bush placed a renewed emphasis on reducing contract sizes with his Small
Business Agenda and one of its major elements, the Initiative Against Contract Bundling.176 In the Contract
Bundling Report prepared for the president, the OFPP outlined an action plan to deal with contract bundling in
the executive branch. This plan included  
accountability of senior agency management for improving contracting opportunities for small businesses
through periodic reports on bundling to, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Small Business
Administration; reporting of contract bundling information through the President's Management Council,
composed of deputy heads of 26 major federal executive agencies; regulatory proposals to require contract
bundling reviews for task and delivery orders under multiple-award contract vehicles; regulatory changes, in
consultation with the SBA and the agency OSDBUs, to provide for review of acquisitions between $2 and $7
million for contract bundling; and additional regulatory changes to identify "alternative acquisition strategies for
the proposed bundling of contracts above specified thresholds and written justification when alternatives
involving less bundling are not used.177  
The Contract Bundling Report also called for greater efforts to mitigate the effects of contract bundling, such as
increased compliance with subcontracting plans by making compliance a factor in future awards; facilitation of
small business teams and joint ventures (e.g., by extending the time necessary to organize teams for particular
procurements); identification of best practices for maximizing small business opportunities; and dedication of the
agency OSDBUs to the president's Small Business Agenda.178  
Congress took further action to reduce contracts unsuitable for small firms by enacting special restrictions on
contract consolidation by the Department of Defense in section 801 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2004.179 This statute generally prohibits consolidation of two or more contract requirements
totaling over $5 million unless appropriate market research is conducted, alternatives to consolidation are
identified, and senior-level determinations are made that consolidation is necessary and justified.180 The Small
Business Jobs Act of 2010 recently imposed additional transparency and oversight requirements on bundled
contracts, and replicated section 801 for civilian agencies while lowering the threshold government-wide to $2
million.181 CICA and other statutes regulating contract bundling or contract consolidation are implemented in
the SBA Government Contracting Programs regulations, the FAR, and the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement (DFARS).182 Finally, section 820 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 requires Contracting Officers to publish justifications of contract bundling and explanations of any
benefits derived on any bundled contracts that use Department of Defense appropriations.183  
B. The European Approach: Addressing Contract Suitability  
In Europe, one of the driving principles behind the procurement system of the EU and its Member States is
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"equal treatment." With regard to the suitability of SMEs, some European commentators have argued that this
principle means equal treatment to companies regardless of not only thengeographic origin, but also economic
power or size.184 This interpretation has been explicitly recognized in a recent policy study performed by EIM
Business and Policy Research Company with commission by the Enterprise Directorate-General of the
European Commission.185 The study cited the Sixth Report (2000) of the European Observatory for SMEs,
which identified "the larger size of the contracts" as one of the key obstacles faced by small business in Europe,
thus drawing the following conclusion: "It appears that the most important reason why SMEs do not try to
participate in European tenders is that the projects are too large."186  
According to the EIM study of 2001 data, a typical SME contract award equals euro249,000, while a typical
large enterprise award equals about twice that - euro453, 000. 187 The median size of contracts advertised on
Europe's TED database is somewhere between the two - euro345, 000. 188 According to the same database,
the buyers with the most SME-friendly median are the armed forces (at euro281,000), while local authorities
tend to have somewhat higher medians (euro3 06,00O).189 Because sixty percent of TED-advertised contract
awards were made by local authorities, these authorities have the most ability to improve contract opportunities
for small business by reducing contract size.190  
Historically, Europe has not had a unified policy on contract size reduction. The ELM study found that while
about eighty-five percent of public authorities surveyed try to provide size reduction assistance, the extent of
these efforts varies widely among different Member States.191 According to the EIM study,  
[t]hroughout Europe, hardly any calls for tender are divided into smaller lots . . . In twelve of the Member States
[including the U.K., Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, France, Finland, Denmark, Belgium,
and Austria], this is done casually (whereby France is characterized by an increasing tendency towards the
division of public procurement contracts into lots), in two of them (Luxembourg and Greece) none of the tenders
are divided. Only in Germany, division of tenders into lots is done often, resulting in a comparatively small
average contract size.192  
Coupled with the fact that the median contract size in Ireland was reported as higher than the average of the
Member States,193 these data suggest that larger European nations tend to be much better at breakouts than
smaller nations.  
Recently, however, both the EU and national authorities began a concerted effort to pursue breakups of
consolidated contracts (also known as contract splitting) as a major tool of procurement assistance for SMEs.  
To a varying extent, contracting authorities have increasingly started to bundle their demands. . . . [t]he
contracting entities can easily, without any legislative changes, create an SME-friendly environment by
abandoning or dismantling such [bundled] structures. ... If the responsible contracting officer does decide to
purchase [this] demand by a central purchasing body or by advertising an extensive framework agreement, the
SME-endangering effect could be neutralised by a separating the resulting contracts into trade-specific or partial
lots.194  
For instance, as stated above, article 1 1 of the European Defense Agency's 2006 Code of Best Practice in the
Supply Chain calls for participation of SMEs and other qualified suppliers in procurements "where competition is
efficient, practical, and economically or technologically appropriate on a level playing-field basis."195 Further,
the Small Business Act for Europe stated that "Member States are invited to . . . encourage their contacting
authorities to subdivide contracts into lots where it is appropriate and to make subcontracting opportunities more
visible, [as well as to] remind their contracting authorities of their obligation to avoid disproportionate
qualification and financial requirements."196 Based on express but general authorizations in the Public
Procurement Directives, the European Code of Best Practices advocates three strategies to overcome SMEs'
difficulties related to the size of large government contracts: (1) subdividing of contracts into lots and authorizing
of contractors to compete for an unlimited number of lots; (2) grouping or teaming of small contractors;197 and
(3) conclusion of framework agreements, known in the United States as multiple-award contracts, with SMEs in
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addition to agreements with large businesses.198 According to the European Code of Best Practices, the first
strategy was supported by laws or best practices from countries including Austria, France, Hungary, Romania,
Lithuania, and Ireland.199 Likewise, the European Code of Best Practices provided that the second strategy
was supported by the EU business partnering initiative called the Enterprise Europe Network.200 The third
strategy, per the Code, was supported by laws or best practices from the United Kingdom, Germany, and
Romania.201 The European Code of Best Practices also advocates greater visibility of subcontracting
opportunities and greater equity in subcontracting. This strategy was supported by best practices from
Romania, the United Kingdom, and Germany202 Similar pro-SME contract splitting and multiple-award
framework agreements are recommended by the U.K. Office of Government Commerce as measures to
overcome over-dependency on traditional, large suppliers.203  
C. Comparison  
It appears that the historic European approach to ensuring the suitability of contracts for small businesses by
means of voluntary compliance with systemwide recommendations closely resembled the approach pursued by
the United States during the 1940s and 1950s. Presently, Europeans are transitioning towards hybrid
measures, which resemble the Competition in Contracting Act ("CICA") and the section 80 1 defense contract
consolidation statute in terms of competition standards and breakup remedies, but also resembling the Small
Business Act in that these measures are invoked specifically (if not exclusively) for the benefit of SMEs. While
the two transatlantic systems share the goal of promoting fairness in public procurement, the United States'
anti-bundling efforts are driven by additional considerations of promoting business ownership, ensuring a robust
supplier base, and making the economic strengths of small enterprises available to the public sector. It appears
that the current U.S. approach on legislative and regulatory standards, requiring Contracting Officers to
measure benefits and costs of bundling pursuant to the Small Business Act,204 has more "teeth" than the
European approach. However, this appearance may be deceptive, as no comprehensive bundling enforcement
data were available at the time of this writing. Nonetheless, further strengthening contract suitability policies by
legislation appears to be the next natural step for the authorities of united Europe and its Member States as well
as for the United States.  
VI. SMALL BUSINESS PRIME CONTRACTING GOALS, SET-ASIDES, AND RESERVATIONS  
In light of the European Commission's trade rhetoric against SME setasides and goals, one might expect that
SME set-asides do not exist in Europe. Such expectation would be incorrect, as both the United States and
Europe have long had small business set-asides, goals, targets, or reservations in various forms.  
A. The U.S. Approach: A Tradition of Goals and Set-Asides; Size or Status as Eligibility or Responsibility
Criteria  
Since the late 1940s, Congress has directed agencies to award a "fair share" or "fair proportion" of government
contracts or orders and to provide for "equitable" or "greatest possible" small business participation in a string of
procurement statutes. However, in the absence of a statutory numerical target, the annual portion of small
business prime contracts fluctuated widely. In the defense procurement, for instance, these awards ranged from
sixteen percent to thirty-two percent every year for over ten years following the end of World War II.205 By
comparison, the small business share in defense contracts is currently in the low twentieth percentile.206 In
1978, the Small Business Act amendments directed the establishment of annual small business procurement
goals for federal agencies.207 The Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988208 established a
government-wide small business prime contracting goal of no less than twenty percent. The Small Business
Reauthorization Act of 1997209 increased the government-wide statutory small business goal to no less than
twenty-three percent of all prime contracts. Congress also established goals for specific small business
categories, as discussed below.  
Congress and the executive branch have authorized or required small business set-asides as means to obtain
fair share objectives and defense or civilian industrial base objectives. The Small Business Act broadly provides
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that  
to effectuate the purposes [of the Act,] . . . small-business concerns . . . shall receive any award or contract or
any part thereof, and be awarded any contract for the sale of Government property, as to which it is determined
by the [Small Business] Administration and the contracting . . . agency (1) to be in the interest of maintaining or
mobilizing the Nation's full productive capacity, (2) to be in the interest of war or national defense programs, [or]
(3) to be in the interest of assuring that a fair proportion of the total purchases and contracts for property and
services for the Government in each industry category are placed with small-business concerns. . . . These
determinations may be made for individual awards or contracts or for classes of awards or contracts.210  
In 1984, the White House Office of Federal Procurement Policy amended the Federal Acquisition Regulation to
implement this legislation on a class basis by creating the so-called Rule of Two.211 The Rule of Two requires
the set-aside of any acquisition over $100,000 "when there is a reasonable expectation that (1) offers will be
obtained from at least two responsible small business concerns offering the products of different small business
concerns . . . and (2) award will be made at fair market prices."212 For set-asides in the R&D sector, "there
must also be a reasonable expectation of obtaining from small businesses the best scientific and technological
sources consistent with the demands of the proposed acquisition for the best mix of cost, performance, and
schedule."213 The Rule of Two applies to task order competition in multipleaward contracts.214 Partial set-
asides are also required where a total set-aside is not appropriate, but contracts can be broken up into lots that
are appropriate for set-asides.215 Further, the FAR requires set-asides based on fair proportion, national
defense, or national capacity grounds.216 The SBA regulations also encourage federal agencies to consider a
small business reservation on multiple-award contracts by "reserving one or more awards for small companies
when issuing multiple awards under task order contracts."217  
Over time, Congress began to establish another so-called small business reservation by requiring that small
contracts below a certain dollar amount be exclusively set aside for small businesses. The set-aside amount
was originally set at $2 5, 000. 218 In the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Congress amended the
Small Business Act to reserve, or set aside, all contracts between $2,500 (sometimes known as the Micro-
Purchase Threshold ("MPT")) and $100,000 (also known as the Simplified Acquisition Threshold) for awards to
small firms in which two or more responsible small firms are available.219 The $2,500 MPT has since been
adjusted for inflation to $3,000, and the reservation range was adjusted to between $15,000 and $250,000 for
contracts related to contingency operations or support of defense or recovery from nuclear, chemical, biological,
or radiological attacks.220  
Socioeconomic goals and set-aside procedures in the Small Business Act have been reinforced by special
legislation for the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Aeronautic and Space
Administration in 10 U.S.C. §2323. Among other things, section 2323 requires these agencies to ensure that
contract dollars and numbers of awards granted under the small business set-aside program are
maintained.221  
B. The European Approach: Warming Up to Goals and Set-Asides; Effective Set-Asides; and Size or Status of
Team Members as Award Criteria  
Historically, Europeans shied away from adopting general small business goals or set-asides at the prime
contracting level. Objections in European literature on this subject primarily reflect academic policy arguments
such as potential economies of scale, the need to ensure that large businesses are treated no less equally than
SMEs, and administrative efficiency; but there is also European literature with contrary policy arguments such
as security of supply, competitive industrial base, and economic development.222 Furthermore, over the last
two decades the European Court of Justice has clarified that it is willing to allow set-asides, preferences, or
goals based on collateral policies if the EC endorses these policies.223 This position apparently remains
prevalent at this time, and the forty-two percent level of SME participation in European public procurement
prime contracts as of fiscal year 2005224 does not present a compelling case for across-the-board goals or set-
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asides. However, when it comes to critically important markets such as R&D or the space industry, the
Europeans are firmly committed to SME-targeted measures including set-asides and goals. Europeans have,
however, provided state aid targeted at SMEs, including SMEs that act as public procurement suppliers.
Further, as discussed in other sections, Europeans prefer to utilize SME participation by including the value-for-
money award analysis as one contract-by-contract socioeconomic criterion. As addressed in other sections, the
Europeans prefer to use binding SME subcontracting targets that resemble both goals and setasides, to be
imposed on a contract-by-contract basis.  
As observed just six years ago, "[s]ince the Competition Law does not allow direct support of access of SMEs to
public contracts, policy instruments have to be concentrated on lowering the obstacles for SMEs on the public
procurement market."225 The EC's procurement directives, which regulate acquisitions of various types of
products or services in Member States, "have been interpreted as allowing for little, if any role for policies
intended to assist SMEs in the European Community."226 This stance is primarily attributable to the EC's intent
to use the directives in order to secure the benefits of liberalizing national procurement markets. Under this
system, SME preferences by national procurement authorities have been disfavored as contrary to the principle
of equal treatment of firms from each Member State. Indeed, "[mjember state programmes designed to provide
preferences for domestic firms or restrictions on entry of the firms of other Member States in procurement may
be subject to challenge by the EC Commission as an infringement of the directives."227 The European
Commission formerly deemed national-firm preferences on contracts above the European-wide thresholds to be
contrary to the requirements of the Procurement Directives then in force.228  
However, as noted by the International Trade Center of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development and the World Trade Organization, the Europeans have not been against SME set-asides in
principle:  
[The European Commission] does not appear to rule out the possibility of preferential measures for SMEs for
procurements below the threshold of application as set forth in the directives. For acceptance by the EC
Commission, such programmes would likely require clear definitions of qualifying SMEs, compatibility among
national regimes, and strict conformity with EC treaty requirements on transparency, equality of treatment, and
non-discrimination.229  
Within the space industry, SME set-asides have a long history at the European Space Agency. The ESA has
awarded at least two types of SME prime contracting set-asides. The first type of set-asides is the EC-
supported "exploratory awards" under euro30,000 reserved solely to "non-primes" (including SMEs).230 The
second type of set-asides is the Leading-Edge Technologies from Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises ("LET-
SME") Announcements of Opportunity up to euro200,000 for a period of six to eighteen months for technical
adaptation, testing, or customization of technologies.231 The LET-SME set-asides have been in existence since
1998.232 Politically, ESA set-asides are also related to the principle oí juste retour, or fair return on investment
made by countries towards the ESA budget: "smaller countries tend to receive their fair return through contracts
awarded to smaller companies."233  
Despite its professed antagonism to U.S. small business set-asides, the EC over time took several steps that
make it easier to institute SME set-asides at the prime contracting level. For instance, over the last several
years the EC has explicitly promoted several R&D SME set-aside programs under the framework of Targeted
Socio-Economie Research ("TSER").234 Ln 2006, the EC's EU Scientific and Technical Research Committee
observed that EC rules also provide for SME preferences in the context of state aid, that EU procurement rules
are unclear on set-asides, and that "[t]he argument for preferential treatment of SMEs under the Community
Framework for state aid for research and development can be similarly applied to public procurement."235 Also,
the EU legal framework apparently authorizes the equivalent of the low-value small business reservation
authority236 in the United States: "Set-asides are legal under European procurement legislation for contracts
below European thresholds. However, this use must not discriminate against SMEs from other Member
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States."237  
Indeed, although the Public Procurement Directive,238 the Defense Procurement Directive,239 and the
European Code of Best Practices240 do not expressly authorize SME set-asides or goals, the directives and
the European Code of Best Practices combined with certain national procurement authorities can have the
effect of set-asides for SMEs or teams involving SMEs. The effective SME team set-asides are created by
operation of four types of provisions: provisions favoring consideration of social factors in procurement,
requirements for mandatory subcontracting with SMEs, provisions encouraging splitting contracts into lots and
placing limitations on lots, and provisions encouraging SME participation by groupings of bidders.  
EU Member States appear open to the possibility of instituting SME procurement goals within their nations as
well as across Europe. The leading advocate for this sentiment is French President Nicholas Sarkozy, who has
taken the position that SME set-asides, goals, and preferences in public procurement are consistent with free
trade and competition principles:  
Now there are things the Americans do which I've never understood us not doing in Europe. Let me take the
Small Business Act: the Americans advocate freedom, but that doesn't prevent them - and I think they're right -
from defending small and medium-size companies and reserving a proportion of public procurement for them.
I'm not telling you that you are wrong; I'm saying you're right. What do I want for Europe? For us to do the same
thing! Because a country needs large groups, but also a fabric of SMEs. You are a great free-trade country, but,
in fact, you have adopted different fiscal legislation for products manufactured in your country from those which
aren't! I think you're right! Because, after all, it's the State's job to support its companies.241  
According to a 2 006 comparative procurement survey through the European Public Procurement Network,
Austria,242 France,243 Greece,244 and Sweden24"1 either have already adopted, or have been considering
adoption of, SME goals, reservations, preferences, or special considerations. Further, in 2007, French President
Nicholas Sarkozy and the French Government formally proposed that the European Commission authorize
reservations of a portion of EU contracts for SMEs.246 The French Government also has been seeking to
negotiate an exemption from the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement for
contracts set aside for European SMEs.247 The set-aside proposal was not made part of the Small Business
Act for Europe, but the concept of goals remained popular.248 For instance, the U.K.'s former Labor
Government has considered imposing an across-the-board thirty percent prime contracting goal for SMEs.249
In March 2008, the Chancellor of the Exchequer created the so-called Glover Committee to address this
topic.250 Ultimately, the Glover Committee concluded in November 2008 that a goal "would not be effective in
improving SME participation in public procurement."251 However, that same month, the leader of the
Conservative Party and current Prime Minister, David Cameron, proposed an "aspiration that twenty-five
percent of Government contracts should be awarded to SMEs" similarly to the U.S. twenty-three percent
goal.252 Further, in April 2009, the 400-member U.K. House of Commons All-Party Parliamentary Small
Business Group sought to expand on the Glover Committee's conclusion concerning SME goals, and called on
public authorities to set nonbinding, ambitious targets for SME contract awards.253  
Another "set-aside light" measure gaining popularity in Europe is highlevel monitoring of SME participation in
public contracts without publicly available goals. Essentially, this is institutionalized oversight by national political
leaders designed to pressure government agencies into more contracts for SMEs. For example, since 2006, the
French Government has required government agencies to measure and report contract awards to SMEs.254
Likewise, the 2007 Responsible Purchasing Strategy issued by the Scottish Parliament calls for regular
measurement and reporting of SME contract awards, as well as evaluations of procurement officials on
contracting with SMEs.255 Thus, it appears likely that SME goals and set-asides will be expanded across
Europe from R&D and space contracting into other types of procurements.  
C. Comparison  
Without question, the United States has been the leader in applying procurement policy tools such as set-
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asides, reservations, and goals. However, the Europeans also utilize targeted policies such as set-asides or
reservations, although on a smaller scale and in specific industry sectors such as space. Furthermore, top
leaders in several major European nations currently support the concept of prime contracting goals. It is likely to
see enactment in the near future. Finally, both Europe and the United States have emphasized small business
set-asides in space procurements.  
VII. CONTRACTING WITH SMALL FIRMS FOR ECONOMIC SUSTAINMIILITY AND REMEDIAL PURPOSES  
Another aspect of small business contracting policy present both in the United States and in Europe is
contracting for remedial and sustainability purposes. In this context, authorities in the United States typically
direct contracts towards small businesses in certain categories closely related to remedial or sustainability
objectives, while the European authorities appear to invoke remedial or sustainability objectives in order to
contract with SMEs without further classifying SMEs into special categories.  
A. The U.S. Approach: Small Business Socioeconomic Categories  
The procurement assistance provisions in the Small Business Act are not limited to helping small businesses in
general; rather, they reach further to several specific subsets of the small business sector. These subsets
include small disadvantaged businesses ("SDBs") (firms owned and controlled by socially or economically
disadvantaged individuals or by Native American tribes, Alaska Native Corporations, or Native Hawaiian
Organizations); SDBs admitted in the SBA's Section 8(a) Business Development Program; small businesses
located in Historically Underutilized Business Zones ("HUBZones") and employing HUBZone residents
("HUBZone small businesses"); small businesses owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans
("SDVOSBs"); and small businesses owned and controlled by women ("WOSBs").256 Congress has targeted
these groups with preferential measures for a variety of social or economic reasons.  
The executive branch implemented additional procurement assistance measures targeted at specific categories
of small firms. For instance, President Jimmy Carter issued Executive Order 12073, Federal Procurement in
Labor Surplus Areas, requiring set-asides for small businesses located in labor surplus areas.257 Likewise,
FAR Subpart 26.2 currently authorizes set-asides for small businesses located in federally directed disaster
areas. In 1983, President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 12432, Minority Business Enterprise
Development, directing all agencies with substantial procurement or grantmaking authority to promote
procurement from minority business enterprises ("MBEs").258 Federal tribunals generally require that race-
based preferences be narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest in remedying past discrimination by the
procurement agency at issue, but permit wide discretion for preferences based on purely economic factors.259  
B. The European Approach: Sustainability and Nondiscrimination as Elements of Best Value  
In Europe, economic sustainability and remedial considerations have been taken into account on a contract-by-
contract basis. Further, while there are no EU-side small business categories, such categories exist at the
Member State level.  
The Small Business Concordat: Good Practice Guidance ("Concordat,T), published by the Office of the U.K.
Deputy Prime Minister in March 2005, provides a good example of a European government that has
emphasized economic sustainability in local procurements.260 The Concordat is an attempt to guide local
government procurements towards integrating socioeconomic considerations into the concept of best value for
money, which is required by law and which balances "economy, efficiency, and effectiveness."261 As explained
by the Deputy Prime Minister's Office:  
[T]he Government's definition of best value is the "optimum combination of whole life costs and benefits to meet
the customer's requirement." This approach enables sustainability and quality to be taken into account when
service delivery options are being considered. For example, the consideration of whole life costs allows factors
such as fuel efficiency and replacement cycles to be taken into account, as well as social (e.g. benefits to local
people, good workforce management, community safety, diversity and fairness). Successful procurement
strategies are likely to be based on whole life cycle cost considerations that include subsequent revenue
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implications, and not simply the lowest initial tender price.262  
The Concordat highlighted a contract clause that imposed the responsibility to contribute to "economic and
social regeneration of the locality" in which the service will be performed.263 The Concordat also highlighted
the European procurement principles; the Local Government Act of 2000, which provided for general powers to
English and Welsh authorities to promote "economic, social, and environmental well-being"; and the Race
Relations (Amendment) Act of 2000, which called for "the need to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, and
to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between people from different racial groups."264  
In the United Kingdom, remedial and sustainability criteria are also part of the procurement system at the
national level. For example, the 2006 Social Issues in Purchasing Guide ^Social Issues Guide") of the U.K.
Office of Government Commerce directs procurement officials to make the procurement process accessible to
SMEs, including social enterprises ("SEs"), black and minority ethnic enterprises ("BMEs"), women's and
disabled-owned businesses, and the voluntary and community sector ("VCS")."265 The Social Issues Guide
also approves the use of procurement selection criteria related to hiring of the unemployed as consistent with
the EC Treaty.266 The Social Issues Guide states that the EC will not disapprove of such criteria provided there
is no requirement that the unemployed be from a certain area or be registered in national labor agencies.267
The Social Issues Guide also indicates that the European Court of Justice will sustain such criteria provided
they do not discriminate against suppliers from across Europe in violation of the freedom to provide services
and the right of establishment.268  
The Social Issues Guide indicates that socioeconomic criteria may be used as requirements incidental to a
contract objective,269 as core requirements of a contract,2'0 or as award criteria in cases of equal bids.271
However, procedures to protect the application of these criteria from fraud or abuse appear to be lacking.  
Recently, the EC again encouraged the use of public procurement for remedial and sustainability purposes.
Section 46 of the EC Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC authorizes the use of broad socioeconomic criteria as
part of "the most economically advantageous tender" procurements awarded on the basis of "best value for
money." The use of socioeconomic criteria must be justified:  
If these conditions are fulfilled, economic and qualitative criteria for the award of the contract, such as meeting
environmental requirements, may enable the contracting authority to meet the needs of the public concerned,
as expressed in the specifications of the contract. Under the same conditions, a contracting authority may use
criteria aiming to meet social requirements, in response in particular to the needs - defined in the specifications
of the tract - of particularly disadvantaged groups of people to which those receiving/using the works, supplies
or services which are the object of the contract belong.272  
C. Comparison  
It appears that the European and the U.S. procurement systems have been used to advance similar
socioeconomic goals and objectives such as redressing discrimination against women and minorities, or
promoting economic development in distressed areas. Nonetheless, the U.S. system provides clear systemwide
criteria for remedial contracting, while the European system contemplates wide discretion by procurement
authorities. As a result, the U.S. system appears to be comparatively easier to use by contractors, easier to
administer by government agencies, and less likely to be abused by unscrupulous companies misrepresenting
their status. The clarity of standards in the U.S. system also helps target remedial assistance to victims of past
discrimination while reducing the potential for reverse discrimination. Consideration of sustainability in individual
procurement is a task that requires additional administrative resources and creates the potential for greater ad
hoc variations or abuse in the conduct of individual procurements.  
VIII. MEASURES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND AVAILABILITY OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
INFORMATION FOR SMALL FIRMS  
One other key procurement issue for small businesses everywhere has been the transparency and availability
of information about government contract opportunities. Here, again, the European and the U.S. systems
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appear to be developing largely along the same lines.  
A. The U.S. Approach: Maximum Opportunity by Law  
Studies conducted in the mid-twentieth century by Congress, especially by the Senate Small Business
Committee, found that "small firms have difficulty in securing adequate information on proposed procurements
or in securing specifications and bid seats."273 Congressional leadership insisted that contracting agencies
"must provide small firms with every opportunity to be placed on bidders' lists or to have their products placed
on qualified products lists."274 In particular, the Senate Small Business Committee expressed doubt that
agency "negotiated procurements" provide for full competition, and "continually recommended that negotiation
be reduced in as many instances as possible and that advertised procurement become the rule rather than the
exception."275  
In the United States, Congress and the executive branch included in federal law and regulations numerous
legally binding provisions ensuring maximum practicable opportunity for small firms. These requirements cover
issues such as forecasting;2'6 publication and notice requirements;277 regulatory counseling;278 interagency
cooperation with the SBA;279 time extensions;280 uniformity in legal rules, studies, and evaluations;281
determinations of competency or responsibility;282 surety bond guarantees;283 and obligations of procurement
officials to justify restrictive practices that exclude small contractors.284  
For example, section 8 of the Small Business Act requires federal agencies with over $50 million in reported
contracts to publish annual forecasts of all procurement opportunities by number, anticipated dollar values, time
of issuance, and responsible activity.285 Section 8 of the Small Business Act further imposes requirements to
electronically publicize notices of contract opportunities over $25,000 on a government-wide portal and to
publicly post notices of lesser opportunities.286 The United States implemented uniform government-wide
electronic advertising of contracts at one centralized point of entry, www.FedBizOpps.gov.287 The United
States also requires electronic registration of its contractors in order to expedite evaluations and payments;288
and it merged Pro-Net, the registration database for small businesses interested in bidding for government
contracts, into the general Central Contractor Registration database.289 In order to assist small businesses with
obtaining contracts, FAR Part 5 established a uniform policy for public advertising of federal contracts above the
micro-purchase threshold across all federal agencies (with the notable exception of task orders under the
indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts).290 FAR Part 5 also requires that solicitations provide adequate
citations to laws and regulations that are binding on small business contractors.291  
FAR Subpart 19.2 sets forth further specific transparency and fairness policies to assist small businesses. FAR
19.202-2 requires government agencies to "make every reasonable effort to find additional small business
concerns" before issuing solicitations.292 Among other things, FAR 19.202-4 directs agencies to encourage
"maximum response" to solicitation from small business concerns by allowing "the maximum amount of time
practicable for the submission of offers"; providing specifications, drawings, or related information; and providing
points of contact within federal agencies on contractspecific issues.293 FAR 19.202-1 requires agencies to
"[ejnsure that delivery schedules are established on a realistic basis that will encourage small business
participation to the extent consistent with the actual requirements of the government."294 Further, FAR Part 19
also references a number of procurement assistance programs overseen by the SBA.295 To assist small
contractors with their financial capacity, the SBA operates a surety bond guarantee program. FAR 19.202-1
requires agencies to divide contracts in order to ensure that every small contractor's work can be guaranteed by
the SBA through the surety bond program.296 The SBA Prime Contracting Assistance Regulations echo many
of these requirements and further impose on agencies the obligations to cooperate with the SBA in attainment
of maximum practicable participation by small businesses.297 The SBA may stop noncompliant acquisitions
and appeal them to heads of relevant agencies.298  
Further, the SBAs Certificate of Competency ("COC") Program provides fair and independent evaluations of
small firms who may be discriminated against because they are small. Per section 8 of the Small Business Act,
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the SBA is responsible for certifying to procurement agencies "all elements of responsibility, including but not
limited to, capability, competency, capacity, credit, integrity, perseverance, and tenacity, of any small business
concern or group of such concerns to receive and perform a specific Government contract."299 Government
agencies are prohibited from passing over small businesses for award on any such grounds without referral to
the SBA, and these agencies must accept SBA Certificates of Competency as conclusive.300 Congress found
that independent determinations of competency and responsibility through the SBAs COC Program and its
predecessor, the Small Defense Plants Corporation capability certification authority, are necessary to ensure
not only fair consideration but also fair share of government contracts for small firms.301 Small businesses are
exposed to prime contracting and subcontracting opportunities through the business matchmaking and
procurement technical assistance counseling programs of the SBA authorized under section 8 of the Small
Business Act.302 In 1983, Congress passed the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, which directed the
White House to issue a uniform Federal Acquisition Regulation with due regard for impact on small business
concerns and with special procedures pertaining to small business concerns.303 In addition, government-wide
and agency procurement regulations are reviewed by the SBA for their impact on small businesses.304 To
promote regulations favorable to small firms, Congress established within the SBA an independent office of the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy305 These efforts resulted in synchronizing rules, reductions in regulatory burdens,
and improvements of transparency in government procurement as well as in other aspects of government
operations. Overall, the U.S. measures on transparency, fairness, and regulatory relief for small contractors are
well-established.  
B. The European Approach: Opportunity by Guidance  
In Europe, according to the 2004 EIM study prepared for the EC Directorate General of Enterprise and Industry,
The Access of SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts, varying regulations and paperwork requirements for
public contracts continue to present a major obstacle to successful participation of small business in
government contracting.306 ELM noted the need for increased education about procurement procedures, the
need for greater use of e-procurement, and the need to provide fuller information.307 Even among SMEs that
are successful in public procurement, around thirty percent of those surveyed in the EIM study do not feel they
are properly informed about procurement opportunities.308  
Publication of business opportunities appears to be the biggest challenge for European small firms, especially
those new to the government contracting market. In accordance with the guidance of the EC, the "Tenders
Electronic Daily" ("TED") provides a centralized electronic advertising source for procurements above the
Europe-wide monetary thresholds that are required to be published in the "Supplement to the Official Journal of
the European Union."309 However, authorities such as the U.K. Small Business Service and Office of
Government Commerce acknowledged that procurements below these thresholds may be subject to a wide
variety of advertising methods, and that small firms must be skilled in tapping into these resources in order to
access government contracts.310  
The EC has addressed these concerns in its European Code of Best Practices.311 Among other things, the
Code makes recommendations on SME assistance practices such as ensuring access to information,
improvements in quality and understanding of procurement information, proportionality in qualifications and
financial requirements, alleviation of administrative burdens, and affording SMEs sufficient time to prepare
tenders.312 The European Code of Best Practices encouraged European nations to develop single, nationwide
procurement portals containing contract documents, as was already done in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.313
Electronic tendering facilities are also encouraged.314 With regards to accessing and understanding
procurement information, the Code recommended personalized assistance, information centers, and training
programs for SMEs.315 In addition, the Code emphasized obligations to provide feedback to tenderers as
required by the Public Procurement Directives.316 Finally, the Code called for financing and qualification
requirements that would not unduly exclude SMEs.317  
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C. Comparison  
Traditionally, the United States has been the leader in providing transparency, publicity, fair evaluations of
competency, and other types of regulatory relief and assistance to small businesses. Continuous leadership of
the United States on these issues is, in large measure, ensured by their legally binding nature. However, these
types of assistance are not presently central to the U.S. procurement system. Instead, their importance has
been eclipsed by the emphasis on goals and set-asides. In contrast, European Member States appear to
strongly emphasize regulatory relief-type measures as a major element of procurement assistance for their
SMEs. The obvious weakness with these European efforts in this area is that they are largely advisory, and
there is no obvious mechanism to enforce them for the benefit of specific contractors beyond political
mechanisms of the EC and Member State governments.  
IX. SUBCONTRACTING GOALS, GUARANTEES, AND INCENTIVES  
Both the United States and Europe have adopted policies and practices to promote subcontracting by small
businesses with large firms. However, in this area, the European authorities have led the way in requiring
meaningful subcontracting participation, while authorities in the United States have attempted to follow the
approach used in Europe on a case-by-case basis.  
A. The U.S. Approach: Nonbinding Assistance Measures  
As early as the 1950s, congressional leadership held the view that "everything possible [should] be done to
encourage subcontracting to small business concerns" with regard to "a weapons system concept of
procurement."318 This sentiment found its way into the Small Business Act, which contains provisions
identifying subcontracting goals for various small business categories319 and directing the prime contractors to  
establish procedures to ensure the timely payment of amounts due pursuant to the terms of their subcontracts
with small business concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by veterans, small business
concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, qualified HUBZone small business concerns,
small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, and
small business concerns owned and controlled by women.320  
Section 8 of the Small Business Act also directs most large prime contractors to include a clause promising
small businesses maximum practicable opportunity for participation in subcontracts.321 Further, section 8
authorizes agencies to offer incentives for subcontracting to small firms.322 FAR 19.708 also authorizes
agencies to provide incentive fees and use small business subcontracting as award evaluation criteria.323
Some agencies responded to these authorities by creating formal mentor-protégé programs, which give large
businesses various incentives (such as proposal evaluation credits during competitions or the ability to count
assistance costs towards subcontracting goals during contract performance) to help small firms build
capacity.324  
Further, section 8 of the Small Business Act, as implemented by FAR Subpart 19.7, generally requires
companies that receive federal contracts over $500,000 for products or services and over $1 million for
construction to prepare small business subcontracting plans.525 These plans are to be based on market
research, and are to contain agreed-upon goals for participation of various small business categories. The
Small Business Act further provides that companies that do not conclude such plans within the time required by
the agency will be denied the contract.326  
The goals for small business participation set forth in these subcontracting plans, however, are not legally
binding. The reason is that the Act penalizes only those prime contractors that fail to comply with the plan
requirements in "good faith."327 As long as a prime contractor can demonstrate that it conducted outreach to
potential small business subcontractors, noncompliance with the goals will be excused under this "good faith"
standard. In theory, the penalty for noncompliance includes assessment of liquidated damages.328 In practice,
such assessments are virtually unknown.  
The SBA has traditionally assigned a forty percent government-wide small business subcontracting goal.329
03 May 2016 Page 25 of 54 ProQuest
According to the SBA data, small businesses received only between thirty- five and thirty-six percent of total
subcontracts awarded by large prime contractors on federal contracts during fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and
the small business subcontracting share drastically decreased to less than twenty -nine percent in fiscal year
2008.330  
Subcontracting policy in the United States is very unsettled at the present time. In 2005, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office recommended that agencies should evaluate small business subcontracting based on
percentage of total contract value in order to promote integrity, accountability, and meaningful small business
participation.331 This method is gaining popularity with federal agencies, as it enables agencies to impose
mandatory subcontracting obligations on large businesses.332 The recently passed Small Business Jobs Act of
2010 requires large prime contractors to account in writing to the contracting agency if the primes fail to
subcontract with small firms to the extent listed in the proposal, and provides for adverse past performance
ratings if primes fail to pay small business subcontractors on time or without justification.333 Further, the GAO
recently issued an advisory opinion that interprets the Small Business Act to allow for zero small business
participation in subcontracting plans at the first tier of subcontracting.334 Thus, there is a strong possibility that
allowing large firms to allot small firms a share of zero subcontracts at the first tier would render the Small
Business Act's subcontracting provisions meaningless regardless of whether subcontracting obligations are
considered to be mandatory or merely "good faith."  
B. The European Approach: Binding Assistance Measures  
European efforts to promote subcontracting have traditionally focused on improving access to information about
subcontracts. It appears that this approach is being increasingly phased out in favor of requiring prime
contractors to comply with mandatory subcontracting obligations. Traditionally, it seems that Europeans have
avoided mandatory subcontracting obligations in their national procurements. As the British Government noted
in 2004, "[t]here is no single way of finding out about subcontracting opportunities, although OGC is
encouraging large suppliers to government to make subcontracting opportunities available via their
websites."335  
However, there is also a strong European precedent for mandatory subcontracting set-asides. For instance, the
European Space Agency uses the socalled Cl and C3 clauses, which reserve certain subcontracts to non-prime
contractors and SMEs.336 Non-primes do not include large systems integrators dominating European
aerospace industry such as EADS and Alcatel-Alenia Space.337 According to the ESA SME Policy Office, the
Cl Clause reserves subcontracting opportunities to "equipment suppliers and SMEs," while the C3 Clause
reserves these opportunities to "SMEs and Research Institutes."338 ESA "[procurements where the Cl and C3
clauses are used include those for technology research activities and for the development of equipment,
components, or instruments - where SMEs and their partners have the necessary expertise, and there favoring
these entities would result in a more efficient use of funds."339 The ESA also uses the C2 Clause for non-
primes and SMEs and the C4 Clause for SMEs on procurements over euro2 50, 000. 340 These clauses
request large primes to provide for adequate participation of SMEs in terms of quality and quantity, or to justify
why such adequate participation cannot be achieved.341  
The European Commission's support for mandatory SME subcontracting obligations is over two decades
old.342 Recently, the EC again gave its strong endorsement to mandatory subcontracting set-asides. To that
end, article 21(4) of the Defense Procurement Directive clearly states:  
Member States may provide that the contracting authority/entity may ask or be required to ask the successful
tenderer to subcontract to third parties a share of the contract. The contracting authority/entity that imposes
such subcontracting shall express this minimal percentage in the form of a range of values, comprising a
minimum and a maximum percentage. The maximum percent may not exceed thirty percent of the value of the
contract. Such a range shall be proportionate to the object and the value of the contract, and the nature of the
industry sector involved, including the level of competition in that market and the relevant technical capabilities
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of the industrial base.343  
Recital (3) and article 73 of the Directive indicate that the Directive is designed to promote SME participation in
the industrial base.344 The mandatory minimum operates essentially as a subcontracting set-aside required of
prime contractors. Article 20 of the Defense Procurement Directive also approves the use of subcontracting,
including subcontracting driven by social consideration, as conditions of contract performance.345  
Substantially similar language is found in the 2004/18/EC Public Procurement Directive.346 Indeed, the Public
Procurement Directive also expressly states that "[i]n order to encourage the involvement of small and medium-
sized undertakings in the public contracts procurement market, it is advisable to include provisions on
subcontracting."347 These provisions would, in all likelihood, closely resemble the mandatory minimums
approved in the Defense Procurement Directive.  
At the same time, the Europeans also treat subcontracting with SMEs as award criteria. Section 1.4 of the
European Code of Best Practices states that "contracting authorities are encouraged to ask their main suppliers
to demonstrate their track record in achieving value for money through the effective use of their supply chain,
including how SMEs can gain access to their subcontracting opportunities."348 The European Code of Best
Practices also emphasizes national practices such as publication of subcontracting opportunities and legal
measures to discourage subcontracting terms that are less favorable than the prime contractor's terms with the
Government.349 Similar guidance is given in the European Defense Agency's Code of Best Practices in the
Supply Chain.350 The EDA further recognizes offsets, including subcontracting requirements to local industry,
as one of the best-value award selection criteria.351  
C. Comparison  
Subcontracting policies in Europe and the United States are the mirror images of their own policies on prime
contracting for SMEs. In Europe, government agencies drive the awards of subcontracts to SMEs in a way that
looks very much like legally binding reservations and set-asides at the prime contracting level in the United
States. In the United States, on the other hand, subcontract awards to small firms have been promoted largely
through "good faith"-based subcontracting plans. Clearly, the European approach will bring more accountability
to subcontracting if adopted in the United States. At the same time, the European subcontracting policy of
mandatory set-aside minimums demonstrates that Europeans are not as opposed to SME set-asides in
principle as the European trade-related complaints about U.S. set-asides may suggest.  
X. USE OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT TO STIMULATE SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION  
Innovation is one area in which there appears to be a remarkable convergence in small business procurement
policy between Europe and the United States. While the United States exhibited early policy leadership in this
area, European states are quickly following suit.  
A. The U.S. Approach: Leading on Pro-innovation Set-Asides  
In 1982, responding to President Ronald Reagan's request, the U.S. Congress passed the Small Business
Innovation Development Act, which established the Small Business Innovation Research Program ("SBIR").3'2
According to President Reagan, " [t]he Small Business Innovation Development Act recognizes that we in
government must work in partnership with small business to ensure that technologies and processes are readily
transferred to commercial application."353 Ten years later, in 1992, Congress passed legislation to create a
supporting program, the Small Business Technology Transfer Program ("STTR").354 Both programs are
codified in section 9 of the Small Business Act, which is implemented in the SBAs SBIR and STTR Policy
Directives.355 For SBIR and STTR purposes, commercialization includes sales to the Government as well as to
the private sector.  
In the traditional U.S. set-aside approach, the SBIR Program sets aside 2.5% of extramural research and
development funds at federal agencies with over $100 million in extramural research and development funds for
awards to small business.356 The STTR program applies to agencies with over $1 billion in extramural
research and development funds, and sets aside 0.3% of such funds for award to small businesses that partner
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with nonprofit research institutions and Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers.357  
To participate in SBIR, SBA regulations require that a company must meet the 500-employee size standards
and be majority-owned by individual U.S. citizens or permanent residents, or by a venture capital firm that is
itself majority-owned by such persons.358 To participate in the STTR program, the research institution must
perform not less than thirty percent of the work and the small business must perform not less than forty percent
of the work.359 Three phases of awards are recognized under section 9: Phase I is used to help a small
business turn an innovative idea into an innovative solution meeting the Government's interests; Phase II is
used to help a small business develop the commercialization of the solution; and Phase III is used for actual
commercialization without the help of SBIR or STTR funds but relies on other government funding or private
sector contracts.360 SBIR or STTR awards may be made using grants, cooperative agreements, or contracts.
SBIR and STTR programs include two rounds of competition; however, the SBIR Policy Directive clarifies that
companies that received the SBIR awards at Phases I and II qualify for sole-source contracts at Phase III.361
Thus, the SBIR and STTR programs are hybrids between procurement and nonprocurement funding. Within
defense procurement, section 9 authorizes a special SBIR Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP) in order to
accelerate transition of small business innovations into defense acquisition programs.362 Some civilian
agencies also have commercialization assistance programs.363 The SBIR program generated tremendous
return on a relatively modest investment. According to the Small Business Technology Council, SBIR
companies have generated approximately twenty- five percent of the most important innovations over the last
decade while large businesses generated less than five percent and universities, approximately eight
percent.364 However, small firms generally receive only 4.3% percent of federal R&D and the non-SBIR/ STTR
share of such funding has been declining.365 Thus, it is clear that the SBIR program is one of the few bright
spots in the federal procurement system that continues to place wasteful and inefficient R&D projects with large,
entrenched contractors. However, the SBIR and STTR programs face an uncertain future. In 2008, the SBIR
program was validated for reauthorization in an assessment conducted by the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences.366 Despite endorsement of the National Academies and support among the
small business community, Congress has resorted to short-term extensions for both the SBIR and the STTR
programs since the end of September 2009. 367 As of early 2010, the United States is in danger of losing these
crucial innovation tools due to legislative gridlock.  
B. The European Approach: Replicating Pro-innovation Set-Asides  
In Europe, according to another study done under the direction of the EC, "almost all countries have adopted
measures to promote innovation in general, and in SMEs in particular."368 Based on the study Innovation
Policy in Europe 2004, it appears that Europeans are deliberately augmenting the principle of equal treatment
regardless of company size with the concerted policy to promote SME innovation through public procurement.
In particular, the study recognizes "the intention of Sweden to mobilise demand through public procurement by
the adoption of a Swedish version of the U.S. SBIR programme."369 The study also observes that "public
procurement can play a major part in creating the demand for innovation," and it noted the plan of the United
Kingdom to use the "government's purchasing power to support innovation."370  
To implement this approach, the United Kingdom established the Small Business Research Initiative ("SBRI").
As the acronym suggests, the policy model builds on that of the U.S. SBIR. The SBRI imposes a small business
procurement set-aside of "at least 2.5% of [the participating Government Departments'] research and
development requirements."371 The U.K. initiative also has an overall target of "£50 million of government
research to be bought from smaller businesses by 2004. "3/2 SBRI is a form of "pre-commercial procurement"
based on exclusion of R&D from the EU procurement rules.373 In the United Kingdom, the SBRI program is
administered by the Technology Strategy Board, a stand-alone government agency funded by the Department
of Business, Innovation, and Skills.374 Just like the SBIR program, the SBRI program has two developmental
phases and a third phase involving procurement of a finished product, technology, or service.3'5 SBRI awards
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are contracts, not grants.376 The SBRI Phase I program concerns feasibility of an innovation, while the SBRI
Phase II concerns product development.377 Phase II participants are chosen through an assessment process
at the end of Phase I.378 At the end of Phase II "it is intended that what has been achieved will be
manufactured and purchased by the Department [which established the need for the topic] as a way of fulfilling
their procurement requirements."379  
The French Government also actively promotes set-asides for innovative SMEs. In 2005, then-President
Jacques Chirac included SME set-asides and preferences into his aptly titled national R&D policy
announcement, Global Competition for Technological Supremacy:  
[T]he State has a responsibility to promote an environment which is propitious for the development of major
industrial projects. This implies having clear strategic priorities: a small number of substantial stimulating
programs - concentrated in a small number of key technological areas. It means that everyone involved, SMEs
and research laboratories, must network around major enterprises. It implies a European dimension, without
which any grand industrial goal would be futile. . . . I'd also like to convey a special message here to the leaders
of the top French companies. . . . Today, you must enter into a new partnership for progress with our nation. . . .
[TJhere's a need to bring in the small and medium-sized enterprises, which, alongside you, are making an
essential and increasingly essential contribution to growth and innovation. It is up to you to involve them more
closely in your research efforts and enter into strategic joint ventures with them. For its part, the State, as the
leading purchaser of technology, will undertake to provide incentives: the government will submit a proposal to
the European Commission on a mechanism allowing some of the work in technology-related public procurement
contracts to be reserved for SMEs.'80  
Under President Nicholas Sarkozy, France has continued pursuing measures to promote pro-innovation SME
set-asides. These measures included "raising from euro133,000 to euro206,000 the threshold for application of
the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement,"381 a fifteen percent procurement participation share for
innovative SMEs,382 and monitoring of government agencies for their contract awards to small innovative
firms.383 National SBIR-style programs have also been adopted in Finland384 and the Netherlands.385 Even
without legislation, the French and other national governments require and incentivize subcontracts with hi-tech
SMEs under a quasi-official "SME Pact" program.386  
In fact, the EC and other EU-level authorities have been themselves promoting SME innovation set-asides.
First, the Public Procurement Directive and the so-called Lisbon Strategy (which called for spending three
percent of European GDP on R&D by 2010 in order to make Europe the most competitive place in the world)
encouraged national SBIR-type reforms.387 Second, projects set aside for SMEs were funded as part of the
EC's Framework Programs for Research and Technological Development, as well as the EC's Competition and
Innovation Framework Program 2 007-2 01 3. 388 The latest list of such funding opportunities related to the
Seventh Framework Program may be found in the 2008 guide published by the EC Enterprise &Industry
Directorate General.389 Third, the EC's Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defense
Industry identifies these funding opportunities as a way to stimulate the EU Defense and Technology Industrial
Base, pointing out that "[sjpecific provisions have also been introduced to encourage SME participation in the
Seventh Framework Program for Research . . . and through the 'Research for the benefit of SMEs' initiative
including, raising the maximum [project costs] reimbursement rate for SMEs from 50% to 75% and introducing
simplified participation rules."390  
C. Comparison  
The United States has led Europe in adopting pro-innovation small business set-asides to ensure that federal
R&D funding is spent more efficiently and does not remain with the same, established contractors. In Europe
today, there is a virtual consensus that this policy instrument is necessary to spur innovation and international
competiveness in the manner that is beneficial to the taxpayers and to the SME sector alike. The United States
must ensure that it does not squander its international competitive leadership by failing to reauthorize or
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otherwise support the SBIR and STTR programs.  
In terms of program administration, the U.S. SBIR program appears to be more competitive than the British
SBRI program. This is because SBIR includes a separate round of competition at Phase II, which gives
companies an opportunity to further improve the commercial potential of their Phase I research. Except at the
Department of Defense, Phase II entry is generally not restricted by invitations. The British SBRI program
contains a direct link to specific procurement programs of various government departments that were the source
for research topics competed at Phases I and II. The U.S. SBIR program, save for the Department of Defense
Commercialization Pilot Program, does not appear to have such a strong built-in link. This may in part account
for the fact that SBIR traditionally funded R&D, which also can be commercialized in the private sector and not
merely through government procurement. When combined with the SME Pact, SBRI can become a strong
alternative policy model to SBIR.  
XI. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSATLANTIC PROCUREMENT REFORMS, U.S. INDUSTRIAL
BASE AND INNOVATION POLICIES, AND U.S. -EUROPEAN TRADE  
The United States has historically led the way in encouraging the development and growth of small business
through public procurement and has reaped substantial socioeconomic benefits such as a more competitive
industrial base for civilian and defense needs, stronger innovation, and greater economic opportunity. In
recentyears, the European Union, many of its Member States, and European agencies have sought to
vigorously use public procurement in order to achieve similar results in their procurement systems and
economies.  
Based on this assessment, policies largely in common across the Atlantic include pro-innovation set-asides,
good government and regulatory relief measures, and pro-competitive measures to reduce contract
consolidation. The two sides also begin to share common approaches to prime contracting set-asides, goals,
and reservations as Europe is expanding these measures across the board. Europe, it appears, is at last firmly
embracing the practical utility of these policy tools. In the end, while the small business procurement policy in
the United States appears to be relatively more sophisticated and further advanced, the ever-increasing size of
the European common market and the convergence in transatlantic small business policies could compensate
for the current limitations of the European approaches.  
From the standpoint of U. S. -EU trade relations, it is clear that the European Commission's complaints about
the U.S. Small Business Act disregards similar European policies and practices. The Europeans have a
substantial history of set-asides and reservations in targeted procurement sectors and programs at the prime
contracting level as well as subcontracting level. Further, the Europeans have justified these measures based
on the needs to increase international competitiveness and to promote a stronger defense industrial base.
Accordingly, policymakers in the United States must be mindful of the fact that competing foreign nations
consider the Small Business Act of 1953 to be one of the most powerful industrial base and competitiveness
policy tools, and seek to emulate the Act themselves. Indeed, the Europeans seek to emulate the U.S. Small
Business Act in order to secure global technological supremacy, even though the SME share of European
contracts appears to almost double the U.S. share at the present time. This would pose a serious long-term
industrial competitiveness challenge to the U.S. defense and civilian sectors if the U.S. Government fails to
maintain strong set-asides and other small business preferences, especially for high-tech small firms. In
addition, European SME preferences contain multiple loopholes allowing for fraud and manipulation by large
conglomerates, while enforcement measures appear to be lacking. In these circumstances, the United States
would be welljustified in refusing European demands to waive or repeal the Small Business Act. Abandoning the
Small Business Act or generally opening up U.S. small business procurements to European firms would be
shortsighted and detrimental to the U.S. national interests.  
This does not mean that the United States and Europe cannot ever negotiate a trade agreement to provide
reciprocal procurement opportunities to each other's small businesses. However, such cooperation is better
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suited for limited procurement programs where both sides contribute financially, agree on a common definition
of a small business and on related enforcement measures, and devise common assistance tools for small firms.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization procurements could be suitable for such an endeavor. Finally, a
commonsense approach for proceeding forward would involve the United States maintaining and strengthening
the U.S. Small Business Act while allowing the European SMEs the same exemptions from the WTO
Agreement on government procurement that are presently afforded to U.S. small business contracts.  
Footnote 
1. Eur. Comm'n [EC], U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2008, at 15 (July 2009), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/july/tradoc_144160.pdf.  
2. EC, U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment Report for 2007, at 13 (Apr. 2008), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/april/tradoc_138559.pdf; EC, U.S. Barriers to Trade and Investment
Report for 2006, at 11 (Feb. 2007), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/ docs/2 007/february/tradoc_
1332 90.pdf.  
3. Org. for Econ. Co-operation &Dev. [OECD], The Bologna Charter on SME Policies, June 15, 2000, available
at http://www.oecd.org/document/17/0,3343,en_2649_34197_1809105 _l_l_l_l,00.html.  
Footnote 
4. Pub. Affairs Section, EC Delegation to the U.S., The European Union and World Trade: Basic Statistics on
European Trade, Comparison with the United States, Japan and Regional Trading Areas, at 1 (June 2004),
available at http://www.eurunion.org/profile/EUUSStats.pdf; see also European Union Relationship with Each
U.S. State, Europa/Eur. Union [EU], http://www.eurunion.org/ profile/EUUSStats.htm (last updated Aug.
3,2010).  
5. Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Histoiy of the European Union: 2000- Today, A
Decade of Further Expansion, Europa/EU, http://europa.eu/ abc/history/2000_today/index_en.htm (last visited
Aug. 20, 2009).  
6. World Factbook: European Union, U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).  
7. World Factbook: United States, U.S. Cent. Intelligence Agency https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).  
8. Eur. Ass'n of Research &Tech. Orgs. [EARTO], Comments and Proposals by EARTO in Response to
Commission Communication 4 (2004), available at http://www.earto.eu/fileadmin/
content/03_Publications/2004_10_01_EARTO_FP7_final.doc.  
9. Press Release, Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., No. 07-12 ADVO, Small Business, Big
Contribution: Small Business Continues to Generate 50 Percent of Private Nonfarm GDP (Apr. 16, 2006),
http://www.sba.gov/advo/press/07-12.html (announcing study results).  
Footnote 
10. See 411 Small Business Facts, Nat'l Fed'n of Inder Bus. [NFIB], http://www.41 lsbfacts. com/speeches. html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  
11. See U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Fiscal Year 2010 Cong. Budget Justification 62 (2009), available at
http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba_homepage/serv_budget_2010_ justification.pdf.  
12. See EC, European Code of Best. Practices Facilitating Access of SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts, at
4, SEC (2008) 2 193 working doc. (June 2 5, 2008) [hereinafter Eur. Code of SME Best Practices], available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/docs/sme_code_ of_best_practices_en.pdf.  
13. See FY 2005 Small Business Coaling Report, U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (July 1, 2007), http://
www.sba.gov/idc/groups/pubiic/documents/sba_homepage/sbgr_fy_2005.html (also listing exclusions of certain
03 May 2016 Page 31 of 54 ProQuest
types of procurement contracts from the total federal contracts figure).  
14. Eur. Code of SME Best Practices, supra note 12, at 4.  
15. See EU Procurement Thresholds, U.K. Off. of Gov't Commerce (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.
ogc.gov.uk/procurement_policy_and_application_of_eu_rules_eu_procurement_thresholds_. asp.  
16. See FY 2008 Small Bus. Gaoling Report, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., http://www.sba.gov/
idc/groups/public/documents/sba_homepage/fy2 008official_goaling_report.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).  
Footnote 
17. See Pre-Commercial Procurement: Key Figures, EC, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/ key_en.html (last
updated Feb. 10, 2009); David Manners, Europe Under Fire for Freezing SMEs out of Public Procurement
Contracts, Electronics Wkly. (Dec. 3, 2003), http://www.electronics
weekly.com/Articles/2003/12/03/31353/Europe-under-fire-for-freezing-SMEs-out-of-publicprocurement.htm
(citing data from the European Federation of High-Tech SMEs); Successes and Failures 2004-2009 ', Eur.
People's Party Group in the Eur. Parliament (May 31, 2009), http://
www.eppgroup.eu/Policies/imco/policy_en.asp; Commission Aims to Make Public Procurement More "SME
Friendly", Client Update (Matheson Ormsby Prentice, Dublin, Ireland), July 15, 2008, available at
http://www.mop.ie/whats-new/publications.asp.  
18. For the industry, public goods are "instances in which marginal private net product falls short of marginal
social net product, because incidental services are performed to third parties from whom it is technically difficult
to exact payment." Abraham Bell &Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theoiy of Property, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 531, 560
(2005) (citing Arthur Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 183-84 (Transaction ed., 2002)). Some
commentators have argued that public procurement is a market for items that constitute or resemble pure public
goods:  
Government contracts frequently involve the construction of what economists call "public goods." Public goods
are items - such as bridges, roads, and dams - which everyone is entitied to use whether or not they pay for the
item. Thus, no market incentive exists to create such goods, because by definition even those who fail to pay for
the good may benefit. . . . Thus, both theoretically and practically, government projects have no market value
because the public has no incentive to purchase them.  
Hal J. Perloff, Comment, The Economic-Waste Doctrine in Government Contract Litigation, 43 DePaul L. Rev.
185, 225 n.302 (1993).  
Others have argued that the means by which the Government provides public goods involves both pure public
good-type items and commercial items that are bought in a different manner:  
Government agencies purchase essentially two kinds of goods and services. The first consists of off-the-shelf
commodities and services that are routinely bought and sold in ordinary commercial settings. The second is
made of specialized products such as weapons systems. . . . Even for the off-the-shelf goods and services,
however, government procurement statutes and regulations sometimes may result in a definition of a relatively
narrow relevant market by restricting the range of firms that can compete for specific contracts. . . . Specialized
goods and services usually present more difficult market definition/market power issues. For many nonstandard
items, particularly military hardware, the government is virtually the sole purchaser.  
Footnote 
William Kovacic &Joe Sims, Section of Antitrust Law, Am. Bar Ass'n, The Antitrust Government Contracts
Handbook 32-33 (1990).  
19. See Kovacic &Sims, supra note 18, at 35 ("The government is not an ordinary purchaser, and it often is the
only buyer (a monopsonist) for specialized equipment in question."). For instance, according to the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has actively encouraged and
supported consolidation in the U.S. defense industrial base. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-
141, Defense Industry: Consolidation and Options for Preserving Competition 1-2 (1998) ("The sharp decline in
03 May 2016 Page 32 of 54 ProQuest
spending by DoD since 1985 has resulted in a dramatic consolidation of the defense industry, which is now
more concentrated than at any time in more than half a century. . . . Since 1990, there has been a dramatic
reduction in the number of prime contractors in 10 of the 12 markets DOD identified as important to national
security. . . . This concentration was not unexpected. DOD has encouraged the defense industry to consolidate
facilities and eliminate excess capacity to remain competitive and financially viable."). The European defense
market has a similar structure. See Martin Trybus, European Defence Procurement Law: International and
National Procurement Systems as Models for a Liberalised Defence Procurement Market in Europe 24 (Kluwer
Law Int'l 1999) ("The economic characteristics of the defence sector are monopsony, the high costs of defence
equipment, and the necessity to take life-cycle costs into account. . . . The defence sector is characterized as a
monopsony. This means that the producers of hard-defence material often have only one prospective customer
for their products: the government. Only their national government or, through exports, a foreign government will
buy the equipment.").  
20. When the Government actively facilitates industrial base consolidation, its actions have tended to reduce
competition, create significant financial risks for small firms at all tiers, and empower large suppliers to misuse
market power by keeping out better innovations and solutions from small firms. See Gillian M. Marks &Norman
J. Fry, Commercialization in Defense Sourcing and Other Responses to Post-Cold War Defense Industry
Transfor-mation, 38 Geo. J. Int'l L. 577, 586-88 (2007) (noting DoD has supported consolidating the defense
industry as long as such efforts produced efficiencies and did not significantly reduce competition, but also
arguing that this DoD-driven consolidation prevents long-term growth of small hi-tech defense firms and instead
facilitates acquisitions of these small firms or their technologies by large prime contractors). A particular risk that
consolidation of the defense industry presents is that an entrenched supplier with a vested economic interest in
a particular technology may use its financial or political influence to prevent adoption of a competing, superior
technology developed by a small, innovative firm.  
Footnote 
21. See Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§631 et seq.). Most procurement-related reforms in this law were initiated in the U.S. Senate Committee on
Small Business and Entrepreneurship starting in 2006. See generally Small Business Contracting Revitalization
Act of 2007, S. 2300, 110th Cong. (2007); Strengthening Participation of Small Businesses in Federal
Contracting and Innovation Research Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus. and
Entrepreneurship, 109th Cong.; S. Rep. No. 111-343 (2010); S. Rep. No. 109-361 (2006).  
22. 15 U.S.C. §63 l-657o (2006).  
23. Id. §63 1(a).  
24. Id.  
25. Id.  
Footnote 
26. Id. §631a(a).  
27. Id. §637(d)(1) (also listing specific small business categories); accord id. §644(e)(1) ("To the maximum
extent practicable, procurement strategies used by the various agencies having contracting authority shall
facilitate the maximum participation of small business concerns as prime contractors, subcontractors, and
suppliers.").  
28. See, e.g., Recognizing Best Practices in Increasing Opportunities for Small Businesses, U.S. Small Bus.
Admin., http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/sbaprograms/goals/SBA_GOALING_BEST_ PR\CTICE.html (last visited
Oct. 5, 2009).  
29. 15 U.S.C. §63 1(a).  
30. See, e.g., Small Business Prime Contracting Achievement and Small Business Procurement Scorecards,
U.S. Small Bus. Admin., http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/sbaprograms/goals/index.html (last visited Oct. 5,2009).  
03 May 2016 Page 33 of 54 ProQuest
Footnote 
31. See 15 U.S.C. §644(a), (g).  
32. See Delex Sys., Inc., B-400403, 2008 CPD f 181, at 5 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 8, 2008) (citing 15 U.S.C. §644(a)
and FAR "Rule of Two": Requirements for Setting Aside Acquisitions for Small Business, 49 Fed. Reg. 40,135
(proposed Oct. 3, 1984)) (interpreting FAR 19.502-2(Jb)); accord Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
1 1 1-240, §133 1, 124 Stat. 2504, 2541 (to be codified as 15 U.S.C. §644(r)) (confirming that small business
reservations of awards and task orders on multiple-award contracts are authorized).  
33. FAR 8.405-5.  
34. See U.S. Const, amend. X.  
35. Exec. Order No. 12432, 48 Fed. Reg. 32551 (July 14, 1983).  
36. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. §471 13 (2006); Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Small Business
Administration and the U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Dep't of Transp. (Nov. 2 3 , 1999),
http://www.osdbu.dot.gov/DBEProgram/memofunder.cfm.  
Footnote 
37. EIM, The Access of SMEs to Public Procurement Contracts: Final Report 5 n.2 (2004) [hereinafter EIM Final
Report], available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/
cf/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=3687&userservice_id=l&request.id=0 (citing EC, Promoting SME
Participation in Public Procurement in the Community, SEC (92) 722 final (June 1, 1992)); EC, Promoting SME
Participation in Public Procurement in the Community, COM (90) 166 final (May 7, 1990); Press Release, EU,
IP/98/233, Public Procurement: Commission Communication Outlines Policy Priorities (Mar. 11, 1998), available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/ pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/98/2 3 3 &format=HTML&aged= 1
&language=EN&guiLa nguage=en.  
38. See Eur. Council, The European Charter for Small Enterprises (June 19-20, 2000), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/files/charter/docs/charter_en.pdf.  
39. Id.  
40. See Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, at 15 (June 21-22, 2007), available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/94932.pdf ("The Reform Treaty will
contain two substantive clauses amending respectively the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty
establishing the European Community (TEC). The TEU will keep its present name and the TEC will be called
Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, the Union having a single legal personality. The word 'Community' will
throughout be replaced by the word 'Union'; it will be stated that the two Treaties constitute the Treaties on
which the Union is founded and that the Union replaces and succeeds the Community."). Because most
literature cited here refers to the former "EC Treaty" name, that reference will be used.  
Footnote 
41. See Application of Community Law: What Are EU Directives?, EC, http://ec.europa.eu/
community_law/introduction/what_directive_en.htm (last updated May 18, 2010) (describing the process by
which the EU law is adopted).  
42. U.K. Small Bus. Serv. &U.K. Office of Gov't Commerce, Tendering for Government Contracts: A Guide for
Small Business 2 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter U.K. Tendering Guide], available at
http://compete.croydonenterprise.com/documents/Supplying_Government_-_a_ guide.pdf.  
43. Christopher McCrudden, Social Policy hsues in Public Procurement: A Legal Overview, in Public
Procurement: Global Revolution 219, 223 (Sue Arrowsmith &Arwel Davies eds., 1998).  
44. Case C-360/89, Comm'n v. It., 1992 E.C.R. 1-3415; see McCrudden, supra note 43, at 223-24.  
45. Case C-243/89, Comm'n v. Den., 1993 E.C.R. 1-3353; see McCrudden, supra note 43, at 223-24.  
Footnote 
46. Case C-225/98, Comm'n v. Fr. Republic (Nord Pas de Calais), 2000 E.C.R. 1-07445.  
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47. McCrudden, supra note 43, at 225.  
48. Council Directive 2004/1 8/EC, 2004O.J. (L 1 34) 1 14, 1 14 [hereinafter Public Procurement Directive],
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:134: 0114:0240:EN:PDE  
49. Council Directive 2009/81/EC, 2009 OJ. (L 216) 76 [hereinafter Defense Procurement Directive], available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:216: 0076:0136:EN:PDE  
50. Public Procurement Directive, supra note 48, art. 80.  
51. Defense Procurement Directive, supra note 49, art. 72.  
52 . As explained by Professor Martin Trybus:  
Defence spending can be separated in two categories. The first is so-called "hard-defence material," for
example, battle tanks, fighter aeroplanes, and warships, which can be used for military purposes only. This is
excluded from the EC Treaty by Article 296(l)(b). . . . The second category is the so-called "dual-use material" or
"soft-defence material," for example, cross-country vehicles, transport aircraft, and rescue ships, which can be
used for military or civil purposes. This is covered by the EC Treaty and the directives, although some contracts
for this material may fall within derogations from the Treaty and its directives which provide for protections of
national security concerns, such as Articles 30, 39(3) and 46(1) EC (formerly Articles 36, 38(3) and 56(1). . . .
Civil goods purchased by the defence procurement authorities, for example, office equipment, are also covered.
Thus the Community has jurisdiction over the market for dual-use material and civil goods but not over that for
hard-defence material - a very weak position.  
Trybus, supra note 19, at 17.  
Footnote 
53. See Defense Procurement Directive, supra note 49, at recital 3 (citing EC, Commission Interpretive
Communication on the Application of the Article 296 of the Treaty in the Field of Defense Procurement, COM
(2006) 779 final (July 12, 2006)); EC, Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defence
Industry, at 6, COM (2007) 764 final (May 12, 2007)). Professor Christopher Yukins argues that the Defense
Procurement Directive may limit national socioeconomic programs of various European Member States, but
may also effectively create a socioeconomic preference in support of European defense firms and strengthen
the defense industrial base exclusions of non-European firms from the common European defense market. See
Christopher Yukins, The European Defense Procurement Directive: An American Perspective, 51 Gov't
Contractor 1 383, Nov. 4, 2009, at 6-7. This interpretation is supported by A Strategy for a Stronger and More
Competitive European Defence Industry, supra, at 6 (calling for the need to reduce intra-EU barriers while
improving the standing of the EU Defense and Technology Industrial Base as compared to the U.S. industrial
base).  
54. Public Procurement Directive, supra note 48, at recital 2.  
55. Id. at recital 46.  
56. Id. arts. 23,26.  
Footnote 
57. Defense Procurement Directive, supra note 49, at recital 3.  
58. EC, "Think Small First": A "Small Business Act" for Europe, COM (2008) 394 final (June 25, 2008), available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:039 4:FIN:EN:PDE  
59. Id. at 10.  
60. Eur. Code of SME Best Practices, supra note 12, at 5-6.  
61. Idat 2.  
62. Id at 2-3.  
63. See, e.g., Baker &McKenzie, Remedies and Public Procurement Laws in Europe 72 (3d ed. 2009) (citing
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB] [German Act Against Restraints on Competition], 26
August 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] at 2546, §97(3) (Ger.) (requiring consideration of SME interests
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in contracts meeting or exceeding EU thresholds through subdivision of contracts into trade and partial lots));
Martin Burgi, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Procurement Law - European Legal Framework and
German Experiences, 4 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 284, 289-94 (2007) (discussing SME-friendly and SME-
favoring practices such as unbundling of contracts, grouping or teaming of small companies, mandatory SME
subcontracting requirements, easier proof of suitability, division of contracts into lots, and limitations of lots per
bidder); Andrew Erridge, Involvement of SMEs in Public Procurement, 2 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 37, 47^-9
(1998) (comparing early EU and British small business procurement initiatives with U.S. initiatives); Ioannis
Petrou, The European Space Agency's Procurement System: A Critical Assessment, 37 Pub. Cont. LJ. 141,
149-50 (2008) (discussing ESA SME preferences); Pieter Taal, Depth and Diversity of a Competitive EDTIB:
SMEs in Defence, Eur. Dee. Agency (Jan. 13, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/
files/presentations/stockholm_conference/depht_and_diversity_of_a_competi tive_edtib_en.pdf (describing SME
procurement assistance measures including SME-focused research programs, assistance with low-value
contracts, and subcontracting opportunity requirements). See generally Ciara Kennedy-Loest, Spreading
Contract. Work to Ensure Security of Supply and Maintain Competition: The Issues Under the EC Directives, 2
Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 1 16, 1 16 (2007) (arguing that procurement measures favoring SMEs at contract
size, teaming, qualification, award, and performance stages are justified because they would carry out the
objective of "opening up of public procurement to competition" as stated in the Public Procurement Directive
(2004/18/ EC)).  
Footnote 
64. Policy on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, U.K. Off. of Gov't Commerce, http://www.
ogc.gov.uk/documents/SMEs(l).pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).  
65. Procurement Innovation Grp., Dep't of Enter., Trade &Emp't, Using Public Procurement to Stimulate
Innovation and SME Access to Public Contracts 16 (2009), available at
http://www.deti.ie/publications/trade/2009/procurementinnovationgroup.pdf.  
66. See, e.g., The Public Contracts Regulations, 2006, S.I. 2006/5, art. 7, K 39 (U.K.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/uksi_20060005_en.pdf (authorizing the stipulation of conditions relation to the
performance of social contracts - potentially including social considerations - to the extent consistent with
European Community law); Public Procurement Act, SG 56 1999, arts. 6, 12, 41 (June 9, 1999) (BuIg.),
available at http://www.bcnl. org/doc_en.php?DID=3 16 (requiring consideration of SME subcontractor
participation in awards of high-value prime contracts and authorizing the Council of Ministers to develop
measures ensuring SME participation in low-level contracts); Veiko Lember &Veiko Vaske, Public Procurement
in Post-Transitional Context: The Case of Estonia, in International Handbook of Public Procurement 409, 420
(Kvi V. Thai ed., 2009) (noting that low national thresholds and a procurement model that disfavors consolidated
tenders can be deemed to favor SMEs); Mario E. Comba, Selection and Award Criteria in Italian Public
Procurement Law, 3 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 122, 124 (2009) (arguing that Italian administrative judges
scrutinize contract qualifications requirements so as to protect SMEs from subjective biases of contracting
authorities); Laurence Folliot-Lalliot, The Separation Between the Qualification Phase and the Award Phase in
French Procurement Law, 3 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 155, 158-59 (2009) (arguing that articles 45, 51, and 52
of the French Public Procurement Code encourage SMEs to rely on qualifications of large businesses as part of
bidder teams or groupings); Marcello Thompson Mello Guimaräes, The Northern European Subset: An Open
Platform fir CrossBorder Procurement, 4 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 175, 182, 195 (2008) (arguing that
Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, England, and Iceland created an e-procurement project, in part, to assist
SMEs with cross-border procurements).  
Footnote 
67. See Aris Georgopoulos, The European Defence Agency's Code of Conduct for Armament Acquisitions: A
Case of Paramnesia?, 2 Pub. Procurement L. Rev. 51, 56 (2006) [hereinafter EDA Code of Conduct]; Aris
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Georgopoulos, The New European Defence Agency: Major Development or Fig Leaf?, 2 Pub. Procurement L.
Rev. 103, 111 (2005) [hereinafter The New EDA]; Petrou, supra note 63, at 148.  
68. The New EDA, supra note 67, at 1 1 1 .  
69. EDA Code of Conduct, supra note 67, at 56.  
70. Id. at 57 ; see The New EDA, supra note 67 , at 111.  
71 . Eur. Def. Agency, The Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, at 1 , 3 (May 1 5 , 2 006) [hereinafter
CoBPSC], available at http://www.eda. europa. eu/genericitem.aspx?area=organisation&id=159.  
72 . Eur. Def. Agency, A Strategy for the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base, at 4 (May 14,
2007), available at http://www.eda. europa. eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Organisation&id=2 11.  
Footnote 
73. Definition of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises, Eur. Space Agency, http://www.esa.int/
SPECIALS/SME/SEMQKIOCYTE_0.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).  
74. Id.  
75. See Defense Procurement Directive, supra note 49, art. 21(4); Public Procurement Directive, supra note 48,
art. 32; A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, supra note 72 .  
Footnote 
76. 15 U.S.C. §632 (2006).  
77. Id.  
78. Id. Ralph Thomas, the former NASA Assistant Administrator for Small and Disadvantaged Business
Utilization, provides a general description of the SBA's size standards methodology: Generally, the size status
for manufacturing industries is employee-based in that a company's size is determined by calculating the
average employment of the company, including the employees of its domestic and foreign affiliates, based on
the number of persons employed on a full-time, part-time, temporary, or other basis, during each of the pay
periods of the preceding 12 months. For service and construction companies, the SBA, for the most part, uses a
receipts-based standard whereby it determines size by averaging a firm's annual receipts, including the receipts
of its domestic and foreign affiliates (less returns and allowances, sales of fixed assets, and inter-affiliate
transactions) for the previous three years.  
Ralph C. Thomas III, Playing by the Numbers: Recalculating How Many Employees Equal a Small Business,
Cont. Mgmt., Feb. 2009, at 43, available at http:s/www.ncmahq.org/files/articles/ CM0209%20-%20p42 -49.pdf.  
79. 15 U.S.C. §63 7(b)(6). This process is rarely used, as most small firms self-certify their size.  
Footnote 
80. Contra id. §632(a) (setting forth a $750,000 annual receipts cap for agricultural enterprises, including
affiliates).  
81. Leverett Saltonstall, U.S. Senator, Lecture on Small Business and National Security (Jan. 25, 1957), in
Indus. Coll. of the Armed Forces Pub. No. L57-102, at ii, available at http://digi
talndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=icafarchive&CISOPTR=28353& REC=4.  
82 . Id. at 2 (referring to the industrial mobilization provisions in section 9 of the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C, app. §309(1946))).  
83. See generally SBA s Efforts to Streamline Size Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Minority
Enter., Fin., ir Urban Dev. of the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 103d Cong. (1994), available at
http://ia311024.us.archive.Org/l/items/sbaseffortstostr00unit/sbaseffortstostr00unit_bw.pdf. Recently, Congress
again increased pressure on the SBA's rulemaking in this area by requiring periodic eighteen-month reviews of
not less than one-third of all size standards and by imposing heightened transparency, disclosure, and public
participation standards. See Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 1 1 1-240, §1344, 124 Stat. 2504,
2542 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §637(d)).  
84. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Guide to Size Standards 5 (2009), available at http://www.sba.
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gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba_homepage/guide_to_size_standards.pdf.  
Footnote 
85. Id. at 5-6.  
86. Id. at 6.  
87. See id.  
88. See 13 CER §121.702 (2010).  
89. See EAR 19.9, 52.219-5 (2003) (providing for set-asides of small contracts for very small businesses within
certain geographic areas).  
90. Sec 13 CER §121.201; FAR 19.102 (2007).  
91. See generally 13 CER §121.201.  
92. Guide to Size Standards, supra note 84.  
93. 13 CER. §121.402(b); FAR 19.102 (2007).  
94. 13 CER §121.402(b).  
Footnote 
95. «§121.106.  
96. Id.  
97. Id.  
98. Cf. 15 CER. §296.2 (providing that a medium-sized business in the U.S. Department of Commerce
Technology Innovation Program (TIP) is one "that does not qualify as a small-sized business or a large-sized
business" with large business defined in part by the "dollar value of the total revenues of the 1000th company in
Fortune magazine's Fortune 1000 listing").  
99. 13 CER §121.1101-.1102.  
100. Seeid. §12 1. 1001-. 1 101 .  
101. See id. §12 1.103. The "ostensible subcontractor rule" was recently described by the SBA Office of
Hearings and Appeals in Analysis Grp., LLC, SBA No. SLZ-2006-09-12-52 (Oct. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.sba.gov/aboutsba/sbaprograms/oha/allcases/sizecases/SIZ-4814. pdf. The appeal stated the
following:  
The ostensible subcontractor rule is an independent basis for finding affiliation between two concerns. 13 CER.
§121.103(h)(4). The purpose of the rule is to prevent other than small firms from forming relationships with small
firms to evade SBAs size requirements. The ostensible subcontractor rule permits the Area Office to determine
a subcontractor and a prime have formed a joint venture (and are thus affiliates) for determining size. An
ostensible subcontractor is a subcontractor that performs primary and vital requirements of a contract or a
subcontractor upon which the prime contractor is unusually reliant. 13 CER. §121.103(h)(4). In determining
whether a subcontractor performs primary and vital requirements or that the prime is unusually reliant, the Area
Office must consider all aspects of the prime-subcontractor relationship including, but not limited to, the terms of
the proposal, agreements between the prime and the subcontractor (such as teaming agreements), and
whether the subcontractor is an incumbent contractor and is ineligible to submit a proposal because it exceeds
the size requirements for the solicitation.  
Id.  
102. Small Business Size Regulations, 71 Fed. Reg. 66,434 (Nov. 15, 2006) (to be codified at f3 CER. pts. 121,
124). Under section 1342 of the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, concerns claiming small business size or
status will have to certify and recertify annually in the Online Representations and Certifications Application or
any successor database. Pub. L. No. 111-240, §1342, 124 Stat. 5204, 5244 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §632).
Section 1342 is intended to override current SBA size regulations, which allow concerns that outgrow size caps
to continue claiming small business status up to five years on long-term contracts.  
Footnote 
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103. See 15 U.S.C. §644(o) (2006); FAR 52.219-14.  
104. 15 U.S.C. §645(d). Sweeping new penalties were recently enacted in sections 1341 and 1343 of the Small
Business Jobs Act of 2010. Pub. L. No. 111-240, §1341, 1343 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §632). By its terms,
section 1341 applies to set-aside and non-set-aside awards alike. Specifically, section 1341 establishes "a
presumption of loss to the United States based on the total amount expended" on a contract, subcontract, or
other type of award whenever such award is "willfully sought and received by misrepresentation." Section 1341
also requires size or status certifications by authorized corporate officials, and provides that certain statements,
registrations, representations, or statements in bids, proposals, or federal databases "shall be deemed
affirmative, willful, and intentional certifications of small business size and status." Section 1343 requires a
federal policy on small business procurement fraud prosecutions.  
105. See, e.g., Centech Grp. v. United States, 555 E3d 1029, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing United States v.
Amdahl Corp., 786 E2d 387, 392-93 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).  
106. 13 CER. §121.103 (2010).  
107. Id.  
108. Id.  
109. Id.  
Footnote 
110. EC, The Nrw SME Definition: User Guide and Model Declaration, at6 (Mar. 9,2005) [hereinafter EC New
SAIE Definition Guide], available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/
files/sme_definition/sme_user_guide_en.pdf.  
111. See id.  
112. Commission Recommendation Concerning the Definition of Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
(EC) No. 96/280 of 30 Apr. 1996, 1996 OJ. (L 107) 4; Commission Recommendation Concerning the Definition
of Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (EC)No. 2003/361 of 6 May 2003, 2003 OJ. (1124) 36.  
113. See EC New SME Definition Guide, supra note 110, at 6; Eur. Def. Agency, Standard Questionnaire to
Defence Suppliers on the Application of the Code of Best. Practice in the Supply Chain (CoBPSC), at 1-2 (Apr.
12, 2007), available at http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem. aspx?area=30&id=298.  
114. See Eur. Space Agency, Definition ofi Sm all è" Medium Sized Enterprises, at 1 (Jan. 26, 2005), available
at http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/Resources/SEMB8HAATME_0.html.  
115. Fed. Dep't of Econ. Affairs, Swiss Confed'n, Switzerland's SME Policy 5 (May 2009).  
116. Commission Recommendation 2003/361, supra note 112, art. 1 (concerning the definition of small and
medium-sized enterprises).  
117. Id. art. 2.  
118. Id.  
119. Id.  
120. See Euro Foreign Exchange Reference Rates, Eur. Cent. Bank (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www. ecb.int.stats.
exchange. eurofxref/html/index.en. html (establishing rate of $1.4268 per euro on Aug. 27,2009).  
Footnote 
121. EC New SME Definition Guide , supra note 110, at 15 (citing Council Directive 78/660, art. 28, 1978 OJ. (L
222) 1 1, 1 1-14 (EC)).  
122. See, e.g., 13 CER. §126.103 (2009) ("Full-time equivalent includes employees who work 30 hours per
week or more. Full-time equivalent also includes the aggregate of employees who work less than 30 hours a
week, where the work hours of such employees add up to at least a 40 hour work week.").  
123. EC New SME Definition Guide, supra note 1 1 0 , at 1 5 .  
124. Procurement, U.K. Dep't for Bus. Innovation &Skills, http://www.berr.gov.uk/about/ procurement (last
visited Sept. 6, 2009).  
03 May 2016 Page 39 of 54 ProQuest
125. Compare Commission Recommendation 96/280, supra note 112, with Commission Recommendation
2003/361, supra note 112.  
126. Public Procurement Directive, supra note 48, art. 47(2).  
Footnote 
127. Commission Recommendation 2003/361, supra note 112, art. 3, §5  
128. Id.  
129. Id.  
130. EC New SME Definition Guide, supra note 110.  
131. Sec U.K. Dep't for Bus. Innovation &Skills, supra note 124.  
Footnote 
132. Compare EC New SME Definition Guide, supra note 110, at 15 (excluding workers on paternity or
maternity leave and apprentices or vocational training students from definition of "employee"), with 13 CER.
§121.106 (2010) (counting part-time or temporary employees as full-time employees).  
133. See 15 U.S.C. §632 (2006); Guide to Size Standards, supra note 84, at 5.  
134. See Commission Recommendation 2003/361, supra note 112, art. 3, §4.  
135. EC New SME Definition Guide, supra note 110.  
136. Id.  
Footnote 
137. See Commission Recommendation 2003/361, supra note 112, art. 3.  
138. 13 CER §121.106(2010).  
139. See generally Commission Recommendation 2003/361, supra note 112.  
140. 15 U.S.C. §633(a) (2006).  
141. Id. §634a-634g.  
142. See id. §631a(a).  
Footnote 
143. See id. §634.  
144. These are generally found in title 13, chapters 101, 115, 121, 124, 125, 126, and 127 of the Code of
Federal Regulations.  
145. 15 U.S.C. §644.  
146. Office of Fed. Procurement Policy, Office of Mgmt. ¿Sì Budget, Contract Bundling: A Strategy for
Increasing Federal Contracting Opportunities for Small Business 7 (2002) [hereinafter Contract Bundling
Report], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/assets/procurement/contract_bundling_oct2002.pdf.  
147. Id. The reporting chain is different for the Department of Defense.  
148. Id.  
149. See 15 U.S.C. §644(k).  
150. See Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974,41 U.S.C. §405 (2006). The Small Business Act also
charges OFPP with responsibilities for attaining small business goals. See 15 U.S.C. §644(g)(1).  
Footnote 
151. See EC New SME Definition Guide, supra note 110, at 5-9.  
152. See generally EC, Doing Business with the European Commission (2009), available at http://ec. europa.
eu/budget/library/publications/public_contracts/doing_business_en. pdf.  
153. See generally EC, Green Paper on Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way Forward
(Nov. 27, 1996), available at http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com-96-5 83_en.pdf.  
154. EC, Commission Communication on Public Procurement in the European Union, COM (1998) 143 final
(Mar. 11, 1998), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=C OM: 1 998:0 143
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:FIN:EN:PDE  
155. See The European Charter for Small Enterprises, supra note 38.  
156. SME Envoy, EC, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/sme_envoy.htm (last visited Sept. 6,
2009).  
157. What Is ESA?, Eur. Space Agency, http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/About_ESA/ SEMW16ARRlF_0.html
(last visited Aug. 23, 2009).  
158. Petrou, supra note 63 , at 1 43 n. 7 (quoting S tacia E. Zabusky, Ethnography in/of Transnational
Processes: Following Gyres in the Worlds of Big Science and European Integration, in Ethnography in Unstable
Places: Everyday Lives in Contexts of Dramatic Political Change 113, 123, 144 n.8 (Carol J. Greenhouse et al.
eds., 2002)).  
Footnote 
159. Id. at 144 n. 8 (quoting remarks by former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Kohl).  
160. New Member States, Eur. Space Agency, http://www.esa.int/esaMI/About_ESA/ SEMP936LARE_0.html
(last visited Oct. 3, 2010).  
161. Id.  
162. SME Policy Office, Eur. Space Agency, http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/SME/ SEMZSYY7QQE_0.html (last
visited Mar. 1, 2010).  
163. See generally Consultative Comm., Eur. Free Trade Ass'n, No. 1081190, Opinion on a Single Market for
the 21st Century (June 30, 2008), available at http://www.efta. int/~/media/ Documents/advisory-
bodies/consultative-committee/cc-opinions/cc-opinon-internalmarketjune08.ashx.  
164. A Strategy for the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, supra note 72.  
165. U.K. Tendering Guide, supra note 42, at 1.  
166. Id.  
Footnote 
167. Saltonstall Lecture, supra note 81, at 6 (calling for multiple awards to smaller firms instead of awards
based on a single large bid).  
168. FAR 19.202-1. There is a disagreement within the executive branch as to whether partial small business
set-asides resulting from severability of contracts into lots can be implemented in multiple-award contracts or
services contracts. See Acquisition Advisory Panel, Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of
Federal Procurement Policy and the United States Congress 299 n.116 (2007), available at
https://www.acquisition.gov/comp/ aap/24102_GSA.pdf.  
169. See Competition in Contracting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984) (codified as amended
at 10 U.S.C. §2304-2305, 41 U.S.C. §253 (2006)).  
Footnote 
170. See, e.g., Phx. Scientific Corp., B-286817, 2001 CPD f 24, at 8-10 (Comp. Gen. Feb. 22, 2001); Pac. Sky
Supply, Inc., B-228049, 87-2 CPD 1 504, at 3-5 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 23, 1987).  
171. See Vantex Serv. Corp., B-290415, 2002 CPD 1 131 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 8, 2002).  
172. Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, 15 U.S.C. §632(o) (1998); see also Contract Bundling Report,
supra note 146, at 2 n.l (citing the Small Business Reauthorization Act as legislative authority).  
173. Contract Bundling Report, supra note 146, at 2 (citing the Small Business Reauthorization Act).
Specifically, 15 U.S.C. §632(o) provides the following definitions:  
(1) Bundled contract. The term "bundled contract" means a contract that is entered into to meet requirements
that are consolidated in a bundling of contract requirements. (2) Bundling of contract requirements. The term
"bundling of contract requirements" means consolidating 2 or more procurement requirements for goods or
services previously provided or performed under separate smaller contracts into a solicitation of offers for a
single contract that is likely to be unsuitable for award to a small-business concern due to - (A) the diversity,
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size, or specialized nature of the elements of the performance specified; (B) the aggregate dollar value of the
anticipated award; (C) the geographical dispersion of the contract performance sites; or (D) any combination of
the factors described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). (3) Separate smaller contract. The term "separate
smaller contract," with respect to a bundling of contract requirements, means a contract that has been
performed by 1 or more small business concerns or was suitable for award to 1 or more small business
concerns.  
174. Contract Bundling Report, supra note 146, at 2.  
175. Id.  
Footnote 
176. «at 9-10.  
177. See id. at 8-9.  
178. See id. at 9-10.  
179. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, §801, 117 Stat. 1538,
1539 (2003) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §2382).  
180. Id.  
181. Sec Small Business jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, §1313, 124 Stat. 2504, 2538. Section 1313
authorizes DoD to follow the $5 million threshold in 10 U.S.C. §2382 once it meets the statutory government-
wide small business goals. Section 1313 also requires all agencies to publicly post justification of bundled
contracts, strengthens the SBA Procurement Center Representative program, and requires a government-wide
policy on bundling.  
Footnote 
182. See, e.g., 13 CER. §125.2 (2010); FAR 6.101, 7.103, 10.001, 19.202-1; DFARS 207.170, 219.201.  
183. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 1 1 1-84, §820, 123 Stat. 2410 (2009)
(to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C).  
184. See, e.g., Burgi, supra note 63, at 287. This would be the case, for example, if SME tenders, in contrast to
tenders of major companies, were verified as most economically advantageous tenders only because of a
financial or other economic preference for SMEs. This procedure would infringe the provisions of the Public
Sector Directive and the Utilities Directive, since the contract award criteria for the most advantageous
economic tender must refer only to the subject matter of the public contract in question. Generally admissible
criteria such as service and oncall maintenance can have an SME-friendly effect, however. Because of the
danger of indirect discrimination, award criteria may only be justified by arguments that are linked to the subject
of the public contract in question and not by the argument of SME friendliness or local settlement. The contrary
position is argued by Ciara Kennedy-Loest, supra note 63, at 122-3 (arguing that procurement measures
favoring SMEs at contract size, teaming, qualification, award, and performance stages could be justified on a
case-by-case basis because they would carry out the objective of "opening up of public procurement to
competition" as stated in the Public Procurement Directive, supra note 48).  
185. See generally ?S? Final Report, supra note 37.  
186. Id. at 79.  
187. Id. at 44.  
Footnote 
188. Id. at 18.  
189. Id.  
190. Id. at 14.  
191. «at 120.  
192. Id. at 79.  
193. «at 216.  
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194. Burgi, supra note 63, at 289-90.  
195. CoBPSC, supra note 71, at 3.  
196. "Small Business Act." for Europe, supra : note 58, at 10-11.  
197. See Burgi, supra note 63, at 290 ("From an SME point of view, this instrument is very interesting as a tool
for their promotion, especially if it is ensured normatively or by means of the contracting authority's behaviour
that groups of economic operators are as equally treated as single bidders. The Procurement Directives
expressly legitimise the formation of groups of economic operators." (citing Public Procurement Directive, supra
note 48, art. 4(2))).  
198. Eur. Code of SME Best. Practices, supra note 12, at 6-9.  
199. See id. at at 7-8. Indeed, German law appears to require not only the splitting of prime contracts into partial
and trade lots in order protect SME interests, but also requires Contracting Officers to obligate prime contractors
to conduct competitive subcontracting of the prime contractors who do not subdivide their contracts into such
lots. Baker &Mckenzie, supra note 63, at 72 (citing Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [German Act
Against Restraints on Competition], 26 Aug. 1998, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] at 2546, §97(3) (Ger.)). In
France,  
Article 10 of the Public Procurement Contracts Code establishes the following principle: "in the interests of the
broadest possible competition, and unless the object of the contract does not lend itself to the identification of
distinct lots, the contracting authority may award the contract in separate lots." The main aim of this article is to
make public procurement more accessible to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) not necessarily
equipped to perform the full extent of a public contract.  
Fr. Ministry of Econ., Indus., &Emp't, Public Procurement Contracts and Access to Employment for Persons
Excluded from the Labor Market: Guide for the Use of Public Purchasers Produced by the Workshop on Social
Aspects of Public Procurement Contracts 15 (July 2007), available at
http://www.uzuvrh.hr/userfiles/file/public%20procurement_ contracts_access_employment.pdf.  
200. Eur. Code of SME Best. Practices, supra note 12, at 8.  
201. See id. at 9. For instance, Romania issued guidance requiring contracting agencies to peg the contractors'
minimum required level of ability at the size and scope of the largest order instead of the entire framework
agreement, Germany awarded framework agreements specifically for small-scale services, and the UK
established an office furniture framework agreement specifically including large suppliers of standard items as
well as SME specialist contractors.  
Footnote 
202. See id. at 10. For instance, Germany requires prime contractors to extend no less favorable payment and
other terms to their subcontractors. The United Kingdom encourages publication of potential subcontracting
opportunities on agency websites, and, from time to time, requires main suppliers to show they have a proven
track record of achieving value for money through effective utilization of the supply chain, including SME
subcontractors.  
203. See Procurement Policy Unit, U.K. Office of Gov't Commerce, Guidelines on Factors That Can Be
Considered When Trying to Reduce the Risk of Over-dependency on a Supplier 1-8 (July 2004), available at
http://ogc.gov.uk/documents/Guidance_to_reduce_ the_risks_of_over-dependency_on_a_supplier.pdf; Kennedy-
Loest, supra note 63.  
204. 15 U.S.C. §63 l-657o (2006).  
Footnote 
205. Saltonstall Lecture, supra note 81, at 11.  
206. See DOD Program Goals and Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Def., http://www.acq.osd.mil/osbp/ statistics/goals.
htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010) (showing that small firms received 22.375% in fiscal year 2009).  
207. Office of Small Bus. Programs, Army Materiel Command, Small Business Program Guide for Government
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and Industry 6 (2008), available at http://www.amc.army.mil/pa/ SMALLBUSINESS.asp.  
208. Business Opportunity Development Reform Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-656, §502, 102 Stat. 3881 (1988)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §644(g) (2006)).  
209. Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-135, 111 Stat. 2592 (1997) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §644(J)).  
210. 15 U.S.C. §644(a).  
211. FAR 19.502-2 (1984).  
Footnote 
212. FAR 19.502 -2(b).  
213. Id.  
214. SecDelexSys., Inc., B-400403, 2008 CPD 1181 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 8. 2008);Memorandum from President
William J. Clinton on Continued Commitment to Small, Small Disadvantaged, and Small Women-Owned
Businesses in Federal Procurement, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,397 (Oct. 13, 1994) (announcing continued commitment
to small business set-asides upon signing of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
355, 108 Stat. 3324).  
215. FAR19.502-.503.  
216. FAR 19.502-l(a)(l).  
217. 13 CER §125.2(b)(6)(i)(C) (2010).  
218. FAR 19.502 -2(c).  
219. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3324 (codified as amended at
41 U.S.C. §15) (implemented in FAR 19.502-2(a)).  
220. FAR 19.502-2(a).  
Footnote 
221. See DFARS 219; NMCARS 5219.000; NFS 1819.201; HSAR 3019.201. The exception to the normally pro-
set-aside procurement regulations was the now-repealed Small Business Competitiveness Demonstration
Program, which forces small firms to compete with large businesses in certain sectors. See generally FAR
19.10.  
222. Compare Nicholas Hatzis, The Legality of SME Development Policies Under EC Procurement Law, in
Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law: New Directives and New Directions 345, 347 &n.10
(Sue Arrowsmith &Peter Kunzlik eds., 2009), with EC, Commission Communication on Promoting SME
Participation in Public Procurement in the Community, at 2, COM (90) 166 final (May 7, 1990), available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/3708/01/000269_l.pdf. In that Communication, the Commission rejected SME-favoring
measures at the prime contracting level such as reservations, set-asides, price evaluation preferences, and
"indirect discrimination [which] could arise where SMEs predominate among the enterprises of a region or
locality that is itself the subject of preference." Id. at 4. The main argument was a criticism of U. S. -style small
business preferences on policy grounds such as administrative costs, economies of scale and other competitive
benefits of large businesses, and alleged disincentives for modernization and productivity improvements. See
id. However, the Communication rejected these same arguments in favor of mandatory subcontracting with
SMEs.  
223. See EC Communication on Promoting SME Participation, supra note 222. The European Commission has
argued that unspecified "certain preference regimes" were contrary to "Community law" and the Treaty based
on the European Court of Justice decision in DuPont de Nemours Italiana Spa v. Unita Sanitaria Locale No. 2 Di
Carrara, Case C-2 1/88, 1990 ECR 1-889. Again, that decision concerned a domestic preference. Further, in
PreussenElektra AG v. Schleswag AG, 2001 2 CM. L. R. 36, the European Court of Justice distinguished the
invalid requirement that percentage of a product be obtained from a domestic supplier at issue in DuPont de
Nemours Italiana Spa from the valid requirements to purchase from renewable energy sources within the supply
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area of public and private electricity suppliers. See Case C-21/88, 1990 E.C.R. 1-889, at 900-02. The renewable
energy requirements were validated thanks, in part, to the policy statements from the European Commission
encouraging renewable energy. See id. However, the Communication noted that "SMEs increasingly gain
access to larger public contracts through sub-contracting . . . [and t]he public procurement directives leave
Member States a wide freedom to pursue an active policy of encouraging local sub-contracting." EC
Communication on Promoting SME Participation, supra note 222, at 6, K 22. The Commission found support for
SME subcontracting preferences in a European Court of Justice decision that approved the use of mandatory
contract conditions and award criteria requiring the use of long-term unemployed, provided these
conditions/criteria were fully disclosed in advance in the solicitation and were not discriminatory on the basis of
nationality. See Gebroeders Beentjes BVv. Netherlands, 1988 E.C.R. 4652, 4661. Thus, to date, there appears
to be no European Court of Justice precedent precluding SME set-asides or goals in civilian or dual-use
procurements as a matter of the EC Treaty.  
Footnote 
224. Eur. Code of SME Best Practices, supra note 12 , at 4.  
225. Caroline Brennan, SME Union, Successes and Challenges for SMEs 56 (revised by Alexandra Fally,
2003), available at http://www.sme-union.org/viewdoc.phpPLAN= en&FILE=doc&ID=2.  
226. Int'l Trade Ctr. of the UN. Conference on Trade &Dev. (UNCTAD) &World Trade Org. (WTO), SME
&Export-Lead Growth: Are There Roles for Public Procurement Programmes? A Practical Guide for Assessing
and Developing Public Procurement Programmes 49 (2002), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/wkshop_tanz_ jan03/itcdemo3 _e.pdf.  
227. Id.  
228. Id.  
Footnote 
229. Id.; accord Interview with Jean-Pierre Jouyet, Fr. Minister of State for Eur. Affairs, by La Tribune
Newspaper, in Paris, Fr. (July 5, 2007), http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Jean-PierreJouyet-talks-to-La.html ("Q. -
What stage have we got to regarding the possibility of giving SMEs greater access to public procurement? The
Minister - We have to find an appropriate legal mechanism allowing us to raise at the WTO the issue of having a
European small business act as the Americans did when they managed to get their own small business act
accepted in the WTO negotiations. With Brussels, it's more a matter of legal adjustment than one of principle.").  
230. See Petrou, supra note 63, at 150 nn.46-51.  
231. LET-SME: An Opportunity Reserved for SMEs, Eur. Space Agency, http://www.esa.int/
SPECIALS/Business_Opportunities/SEM7ND8LURE_0.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).  
232. See id.  
233. Petrou, supra note 63 , at 1 70; accord Select Comm. on Trade &Indus., Tenth Report - UK. Space Policy,
1999-2000, H.C. 335, 1 22 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cml99900/cmselect/cmtrdind/335/33510.htm ("ESAlargely (and historically) operates on the
principle of 'juste retour': the principles that the proportion of contracts under a particular program awarded to
firms from a given country is in proportion to the funding that country has contributed to the program.").  
234. Petrou, supra note 63, at 150n. 48 (citing SME set-asides under the EC's Fourth and Fifth Research
&Development Framework Programs).  
Footnote 
235. EU Scientific &Tech. Research Comm. (CREST), EC, Design Measures to Promote Growth of Young
Research-Intensive SMEs and Start-Ups: Report of the CREST Expert Group 16 (Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.insme.org/documenti/Promoting_Innovative_ SMEs_&_Startup.pdf.  
236. SeeFAR19.502-2(a).  
237. Andrew Erridge, Involvement of SMEs in Public Procurement, 7 Pur. Procurement L. Rev. 37,41(1998).  
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238. Public Procurement Directive, supra note 48.  
239. Defense Procurement Directive, supra note 49.  
240. Eur. Code of SME Best Practices, supra note 12.  
241 . Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Fr. Republic, Speech at His Meeting with the Members of the French-
American Business Council During His Official Visit to the United States, Washington (Nov. 6, 2007),
http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-speech-to-US. html.  
Footnote 
2 42 . 2006 Survey on National Public Procurement Regulations Favoring SMEs, Pub . Procurement Network,
http://www.publicprocurertientnetwork.org/b4-l.htin (last updated 2006) (cached version accessed on
Archive.org) ("Question: Is there in your country a regulation that favours or benefits SME's (small or medium
enterprises), for example by an obligation or otherwise (like contracts below certain thresholds are only for
SME's or 25 % of all contracts by a contracting authority have to be awarded to SME's)? . . . Austria: No legal
obligation to favor SME's exists. Although in some cases SME's are to be taken in due consideration.").  
243. Id. at 2 ("France: No, currently not (considering changes) but there are several general provisions that
apply to all economic operators but are particularly useful for SME's.").  
244. Id. ("Greece: Yes, there is a regulation as regards works and research contracts that favors SME's through
the obligatory registration of companies in classes depending on their size and the level of the budget of
contracts sought. Thus, lower class registered companies can participate in competitions for contracts of lower
budget where other, in higher-class registered companies may not.").  
245. See id. at 3 ("Sweden: No such regulation, but Sweden has adopted a secondary legislation within the
system of government procurement of framework agreements, in which one phrase says: 'In that connection
(framework agreements - editors' comment) the possibility of small and medium size enterprises to participate in
the procurements shall be considered.'").  
246. See, e.g., France Softens Its Stance mi EU Small Business Act, EurActiv.com (Jan. 28, 2008),
http://www.euractiv.com/de/node/219270. Notably, French President Nicholas Sarkozy campaigned on the
promise to set aside U. S. -style small business set-asides, reservations, and preferences in French
procurement, and has spoken out in support of "positive discrimination" for SMEs, which received thirty-three
percent of French public procurement dollars as of 2007. See Cyrille Emery, PME: Sarkozy veut une
discrimination positive et Alain Lambert veut supprimer le Code [SMEs: Sarkozy Wants Positive Discrimination
and Alan Lamben Wants to Remove the Code], PublicTendering.com (Dec. 10, 2007),
http://www.publicteiidering.com/en/pme-sarkozy-veutune-discrimination-positive-et-alain-lambert-veut-
supprimer-le-code; Lionel Stoléru: "Il est urgent d'amener les PME àfort potentiel sur le marché mondiaV [Lionel
Stoleru: It is Urgent to Bring SMEswith High Potential into the Global Market], PublicTendering.com (Jan. 7,
2008), http://www. publictendering.com/en/lionel-stoleru-il-est-urgent-damener-les-pme-a-fort-potentiel-sur-
lemarche-mondial. However, his set-aside plans were stymied by the World Trade Organization Agreement on
Government Procurement and position of the French Council of State, and he had to settle for monitoring of
agency SME contract award trends and more limited preferences at the present time. See id.  
247. See Fr. Ministry of Econ., Indus., &Emp't, Europe for SMEs: SME Access to Public Procurement, a Vital
Commitment 2 (2006), available at http://www.insme.org/documents/ Anglais22-9.pdf.  
248. See, e.g., France Softens Its Stance on EU Small Business Act, supra note 246.  
Footnote 
249. Advisory Comm. on Action to Reduce Barriers to SME Participation in Pub. Procurement, H.M. Treasury,
Accelerating the SAIE Economic Engine: Through Transparent, Simple, and Strategic Procurement 3 (Nov.
2008) (U.K.).  
250. See id.  
251. Id.  
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252. David Cameron Visits WEEE Recycling Firm in Kent, LetsRecycle.com (Nov. 5, 2008),
http://www.letsrecycle.com/do/ecco.py /vi ew_item?listid= 3 7&listcatid=354&listitemid= 1062 3.  
253. See U.K. House of Commons All-Party Parliamentary Small Bus. Grp., Report on SME Access to Public
Procurement 3 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.oxfordinstitute.
org/pubs/about/public_affairs/unit/business_groups/inquiries/report.pdf. This Group includes members in both
the House of Commons and the House of Lords.  
254. Celine Ide, Soulier Advocates, Will the European Union Succeed in Implementing a Mechanism of Support
for Small and Medium-Sized Businesses as Already Implemented Since 1953 in the United States? 1 (2008),
available at http://www.soulier-avocats.com/up load/documents/Article_CI_SBA_may_2008_final2.pdf ("Decree
No. 2006-975 of August 1, 2006 amended the French Public Procurement Code for a better access for SMEs to
public procurement. The main amendments concerned: a) the subdivision of contracts into lots, b) the creation
of more flexible rules for economic operators to prove their technical abilities . . . [and] c) the obligation for
purchasers to measure and report on contracts awarded to SMEs.").  
255. See Scottish Parliament, Responsible Purchasing Strategy 14-19 (2007), available at
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/corporate/procurement/docs/Strategy-FINAL.pdf.  
Footnote 
256. 15 U.S.C. §644(g) (2006).  
257. Exec. Order No. 12,073, 43 Fed. Reg. 36,873, 36,873 (Aug. 16, 1978).  
Footnote 
258. Exec. Order No. 12,432, 48 Fed. Reg. 32,551, 32,551 (July 14, 1983).  
259. Compare Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep't of Def, 545 F.3d 1023, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (invalidating race-based
preferences in defense contracting for lack of evidence of past discrimination in the legislative record), with
AshBritt Inc., B-297889 et al., 2006 CPD 1 48 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 20, 2006) (validating state-specific local
preferences for disaster recovery contracting).  
260. See U.K. Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Small Business Concordat: Good Practice Guidance 7, 13
(Mar. 2005), available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/ localgovernment/pdf/ 135262.pdf.  
261. Id.  
262. Id at 13.  
263. Id.  
Footnote 
264. Id.at 13-14.  
265. U.K. Office of Gov't Commerce, Social Issues in Purchasing 9 (Feb. 2006), available at h ttp:/Avww.ogc.
gov.uk/documents/Social_Issues_in_Purchasing.pdf.  
266. Id. at 26, 32.  
267. Id. at 32.  
268. Id. at 26, 32 (citing Case C-225-98, Comm'n v. Fr. Republic (Nord Pas de Calais), 2000 E.C.R. 1-07445
(authorizing effective contract preferences for SMEs hiring the unemployed)).  
269. See id. at 11.  
270. «.at 15.  
271. Id. at 27. See generally id. at 34-41.  
Footnote 
272. Public Procurement Directive, supra note 48, at recital 46.  
273. Saltonstall Lecture, supra note 81, at 5.  
274. Id.  
275. Id.  
Footnote 
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276. See 15 U.S.C. §637(a)(12) (2006).  
277. See FAR 5.1, 5.2.  
278. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §634b-634c; FAR 19.202-4(c).  
279. See FAR 19.4.  
280. See FAR 19.202-1.  
281. See 15 U.S.C. §405, 405a.  
282. See 13 CER. §125.5 (2010); FAR 19.6.  
283. See 13 CER. §115; FAR 28.2.  
284. See 13 CER. §125.5; FAR 19.2.  
285. 15 U.S.C. §637(a)(12) (requiring agencies to make forecasts available to small businesses, the SBA, and
agency OSDBU offices). Agencies typically make these forecasts available on the Internet. See, e.g.,
Acquisition Forecast, U.S. Dep't of Energy, http://diversity.doe.gov/business/ acquisition_forecast.htm (last
visited Feb. 23, 2010).  
286. See 15 U.S.C. §637(e); FAR 5.101.  
287. See FAR 5.1-5.3.  
288. See FAR 4.11.  
289. See SBA, OMB, GSA, and DOD Work Together to Integrate Pro-Net and CCR Database and Simplify
Contracting Process for Small Businesses, U.S. Small Bus. Ass'n, http://web.sba.gov/ pro-
net/docrootpages/index.html (last modified Aug. 13, 2004).  
290. See FAR 5.101.  
291. See FAR 5.102.  
Footnote 
292. FAR 19.202-2.  
293. FAR 19.202-4.  
294. FAR 19.202-1.  
295. See, e.g., John R. Tolle, Small Business Contracting (Pts. 1-2), Briefing Papers, Oct. 1999, at 1, Briefing
Papers, Nov. 1999, at 1.  
296. See 13 CER. §115(2010).  
297. See id. §125.2 (2010).  
298. See id. §125.2(b)(7); FAR 19.4.  
299. 15 U.S.C. §637(b)(7)(A) (2006).  
300. See id. §637(b)(7)(C); 13 CER. §125.5; FAR 19.602-4(b) (2005).  
Footnote 
301. See Siller Bros., Inc. v. United States, 655 E2d 1039, 1043-44 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (describing the legislative
history of the Certificate of Competency program), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 925 (1982).  
302. See 15 U.S.C. §6360.  
303. See id. §405a.  
304. See id. §637(a).  
305. See id. §634a.  
306. See EIM Final Report, supra note 3 7, at 94.  
307. Id. at 6.  
308. Id. at 92.  
Footnote 
309. See TED-Tenders Electronic Daily, http://ted. europa. eu/Exec?Template=TED/edi
torial_page.htm&DataFlow=ShowPage.dfl&StatLang=EN (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).  
310. U.K. Tendering Guide, supra note 42, at 3.  
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311. Eur. Code of SME Best Practices, supra note 12, at 10-11.  
312. Seeid. at 10-20.  
313. Id. at 11 ("In Latvia, all public tender notices are published on a single web portal which is accessible free
of charge and offers daily news service. In Estonia, there is a single online public procurement register for all
contract notices which is the sole medium for publishing at national level. Lithuania also uses a single web
portal for all contract notices; this offers the possibility for multi-criteria search as well as user interfaces
available in Lithuanian and English.").  
314. «at 11.  
315. «at 12-13.  
316. «at 12.  
317. «at 14.  
Footnote 
318. Saltonstall Lecture, supra note 81, at 5-6.  
319. 15 U.S.C. §644(2006).  
320. Id. §637(d).  
321. Id.  
322. The incentive authority in 15 U.S.C. §637(d)(4)(E) provides:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, every Federal agency, in order to encourage subcontracting
opportunities for small business concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by veterans, small
business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans, qualified HUBZone small business
concerns, and small business concerns owned and controlled by the socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals as defined in paragraph (3) of this subsection and for small business concerns owned and controlled
by women, is hereby authorized to provide such incentives as such Federal agency may deem appropriate in
order to encourage such subcontracting opportunities as may be commensurate with the efficient and
economical performance of the contract: Provided, That, this subparagraph shall apply only to contracts let
pursuant to the negotiated method of procurement.  
Footnote 
323. FAR 19.708.  
324. See, e.g., Mentor-Protégé Program , U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.
gov/xopnbiz/smallbusiness/editorial_0716.shtm (last modified July 1, 2010).  
325. See FAR 19.7.  
326. See 15 U.S.C. §637(d)(4)(B)-(D), which provides:  
(B) Before the award of any contract to be let, or any amendment or modification to any contract let, by any
Federal agency which - (i) is to be awarded, or was let, pursuant to the negotiated method of procurement, (ii) is
required to include the clause stated in paragraph (3), (iii) may exceed $1,000,000 in the case of a contract for
the construction of any public facility, or $500,000 in the case of all other contracts, and (iv) which offers
subcontracting possibilities, the apparent successful offeror shall negotiate with the procurement authority a
subcontracting plan which incorporates the information prescribed in paragraph (6). The subcontracting plan
shall be included in and made a material part of the contract. (C) If, within the time limit prescribed in regulations
of the Federal agency concerned, the apparent successful offeror fails to negotiate the subcontracting plan
required by this paragraph, such offeror shall become ineligible to be awarded the contract. Prior compliance of
the offeror with other such subcontracting plans shall be considered by the Federal agency in determining the
responsibility of that offeror for the award of the contract. (D) No contract shall be awarded to any offeror unless
the procurement authority determines that the plan to be negotiated by the offeror pursuant to this paragraph
provides the maximum practicable opportunity for small business concerns, qualified HUBZone small business
concerns, small business concerns owned and controlled by veterans, small business concerns owned and
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controlled by servicedisabled veterans, small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals, and small business concerns owned and controlled by women to
participate in the performance of the contract.  
327. See id. §637(d)(4)(F)(ii) ("The contractor shall be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate a good faith effort
regarding compliance prior to the contracting officer's final decision regarding the imposition of damages and
the amount thereof. The final decision of a contracting officer regarding the contractor's obligation to pay such
damages, or the amounts thereof, shall be subject to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 U.S.C. §601-
613)).").  
Footnote 
328. Id.  
329. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Oefice, GAO-05-459, Department of Energy: Improved Oversight Could
Better Ensure Opportunities for Small Business Subcontracting 6 (2005).  
330. U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Federal FY2008 Procurement Subcontracting Report (2009), available at
http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups/public/documents/sba_homepage/fy2008_ pro_subcontracting_rep.pdf; Sub-
contracting Goals and Reports, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., http://
www.sba.gov/aboutsba/sbaprograms/goals/SBGR_2006_SCGR.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) (linking to
subcontracting reports for fiscal years 2004 through 2007). Historically, however, small businesses have
received close to forty percent of total subcontracted dollars government-wide. See Office of Advocacy, U.S.
Small Bus. Admin., Report No. 281, The Government's Role in Aiding Small Business Federal Subcontracting
Programs in the United States 1, 3 (2006), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/researcli/rs281tot.pdf.  
331. See Improved Oversight Could Better Ensure Opportunities for Small Business Subcontracting, supra note
329, at 27.  
332. See, e.g., Nova Builders, B-402091 et al., 2010 CPD 1 33, at 13-14 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 19, 2010)
(mandatory subcontracting obligations imposed by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs); see also Press
Release, Sen. Olympia Snowe, Energy Department to Comply with Small Business Act's Subcontracting Rules
(June 20, 2005) (announcing the Department of Energy's agreement to follow subcontracting measurement
recommendations in the Improved Subcontracting Oversight Report, GAO-05-459).  
333. See Small Business jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, §1322, 1334, 124 Stat. 2504, 2541-42.  
334. See Northrop Grumman Space &Missile Sys. Corp., B-400837 et al., 2009 CPD f 52, at 16 (Comp. Gen.
Feb. 17, 2009).  
Footnote 
335. U.K. Tendering Guide, supra note 42, at 5.  
336. Procurement Policy on Fair Access for SMEs - the C1-C4 Clauses, Eur. Space Agency,
http://www.esa.int/esaMI/Business_Opportunities/SEMECJ0CYTE_0.litml (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).  
337. Id.  
338. Id.  
339. Id.  
340. Id.  
341. Id.  
342. SeeRC, Communication to the Council: PromotingSMEParticipation in Public Procurement in the
Community, COM (90) 166 final (May 7, 1990),ara/7«¿&«íhttp://aei.pitt.edu/3708/01/000269_l. pdf; EC,
Communication from the Commission: Development of Subcontracting in the Community, COM (89) 402 final
(Aug. 7, 1989), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/3761/01/000244_l.pdf.  
Footnote 
343. Defense Procurement Directive, supra note 49, art. 2 1(4). The Defense Procurement Directive language
authorizing mandatory SME subcontracting obligations appears to be a means of ensuring "meaningful"
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participation of European Member States with a large concentration of SME defense firms without reliance on
the principle oí juste retour. Cf. EDA Code of Conduct, supra note 67, at 56-57 (describing the need to ensure
"meaningful" participation of national SME defense suppliers).  
344. Defense Procurement Directive, supra note 49, art. 3(73).  
345. Id. art. 20.  
346. See Public Procurement Directive, supra note 48, at recitals 1, 46 &art. 26.  
347. «at 32.  
348. Eur. Code of SME Best. Practices, supra note 12, at 10.  
349. See id. at 10.  
Footnote 
350. Specifically, the Code of Best Practices in the Supply Chain provides:  
In assessing what is economically advantageous in the selection of Suppliers, it shall be taken into
consideration that both Buyers and Suppliers need to take strategic sourcing decisions that are wider than
individual contract or programme requirements. ... In evaluating tenders of Suppliers, buyers will consider,
amongst other things, the approach undertaken or proposed for the selection of sources of supply (including,
where appropriate, make or buy plans), having regard to the principles of the CoBPSC. . . . Monitoring
arrangements will be introduced to assess the extent to which the CoBPSC is being applied. It will be based on
Prime Contractors providing information on sub-contract opportunities advertised.  
CoBPSC, supra note 71, at 4.  
351. See Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, Eur. Dee. Agency (last updated Mar. 5, 2007),
http://www.eda.europa.eu/genericitem.aspx?area=Organisation&id=154 ("The fundamental criterion for the
selection of the contractor will be the most economically advantageous solution for the particular requirement,
taking into account inter alia considerations of costs (both acquisition and life cycle), compliance, quality and
security of supply and offsets."). The European Commission defined offsets on defense purchases as follows:
"This allows the purchasing country to require a return on investment that may exceed 100% of the value of the
contract. Such offsets may be direct, in the form of orders for local companies or transfers of know-how and
technology related to the original contract. Offsets may also be indirect and concern industrial sectors other than
the one covered by the contract in question, even non-military ones." EC, Green Paper on Defence
Procurement, at 5, COM (2004) 608 final (Sept. 23, 2004), available at http://eur-lex. europa.
eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2004/coni2004_0608en01. pdf.  
Footnote 
352. See f 5 U.S.C. §638 (2006).  
353. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, 2
Pub. Papers 960 (July 22, 1982), available at http://www.presidency. ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=42777.  
354. See 15 U.S.C. §638.  
355. See generally Small Business Technology Transfer Program Policy Directive, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,926-01
(Small Bus. Admin. Dec. 16, 2005) [hereinafter STTR Policy Directive], amended by 72 Fed. Reg. 23,405 (Apr.
30, 2007); Small Business Innovation Research Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,071 (Small Bus. Admin. Sept. 24,
2002) [hereinafter SBIR Policy Directive], amended by 72 Fed. Reg. 23,407-01 (Apr. 30, 2007). The
amendments were designed to implement President George W. Bush's Exec. Order No. 13,329, Encouraging
Innovation in Manufacturing, 69 Fed. Reg. 9181 (Feb. 24, 2004).  
356. See 15 U.S.C. §638.  
357. See id.  
358. Press Release, Small Bus. Admin., No. 07-69, FAQ on SBA's SBIR Program and Venture Capital
Investment (Oct. 18, 2007), available at http://www.bizgeorgia.com/News/SmallBusiness-Administration/SBIR%
1 IVA/.  
03 May 2016 Page 51 of 54 ProQuest
359. See STTRPolicy Directive, 70 Fed. Reg. at 74,925-74,931.  
360. See 15 U.S.C. §638.  
361. See STTR Policy Directive, 70 Fed. Reg. at 74,926-31; SBIR Policy Directive, 67 Fed. Reg. at 60,071-85.  
362. See Small Business Innovation Research, U.S. Dep't of Dee, http://www.dodsbir.net/cpp/ default.htm (last
visited Oct. 1, 2010); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-63, §252, 119
Stat. 3136 (Jan. 6, 2006).  
363. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Energy Research and Technical Assistance Program (Work for Others
Program), Oak Ridge Nat'l Lab., http://www.ornl.gov/adm/wfo/exthome.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2010); DHS
S&TSBIR Program: Cost Match Feature, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec,
https://www.sbir.dhs.gov/CostMatchInfo.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).  
364. See Roundtable on Small Business Research and Development: Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus.
&Entrepreneurship, 1 1 1th Cong. 1 (June 4, 2009) (statement ofjere Glover, Exec. Dir., Small Bus. Tech.
Council), available at http://www.nsba.biz/docs/09_smallbusinessr_d_testimony.pdf.  
365. See id.  
366. See Comm. for Capitalizing on Sci., Tech., &Innovation, Nat'l Acads., An Assessment of the SBIR Program
(Charles W. Wessner ed., Nat'l Acads. Press 2008), available at http:// www.nap.edu/catalog.phpPrecord_id=!
1989#toc.  
Footnote 
367. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §847-848, 123 Stat.
2190 (Oct. 28, 2009) (providing for one-year extension of Department of Defense SBIR, SBIR CPP, and STTR
programs); Congress Extends SBIR Program for 90 Days, Small Bus. Tech. Council (Jan. 28, 2010),
http://www.nsba.biz/content/2832.shtml ("This is the sixth CR [Continuing Resolution] passed since the SBIR
program was originally up for expiration in 2008.").  
368. EC, Trend Chart: Innovation Policy in Europe 2004, at 27 (2005), available at http://
www.euroqualityfiles.net/cecistnet/FP6-FP7-portals/IST-ICT/Report/Innovation_policy_ europe_2004.pdf.  
369. Id.  
370. «at 98.  
371. U.K. Tendering Guide, supra note 42 , at 5 .  
372. Id.  
373. See Dep't for Bus. Innovation &Skills, U.K. Office of Gov't Commerce, Driving Innovation Through Public
Procurement 13 (July 2009), available at http://www.ogc.gov.uk/ documents/OGC09-0679_Inn
ovationBrochure.pdf.  
374. See Tech. Strategy Bd., SBRI 3 (2009) (U.K.), available at http://www.inn0vateuk.0rg/_
assets/pdf/Corporate-Publications/SBRI%20intro%20brochure.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2010).  
Footnote 
375. See id. at 4.  
376. See id. at 3.  
377. See id. at 4.  
378. See id.  
379. SBRI FAQs, Tech. Strategy Bd. (U.K.), http://www.innovateuk.org/_assets/pdf/ sbri-faqs.pdf (last visited
Sep. 16, 2009).  
380. M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Fr. Republic, Speech on Global Competition for Technological
Supremacy: Setting out France's Policy on Research and Innovation (Aug. 30, 2005), http://www.ambafrance-
uk.org/Global-competition-for.html.  
381. Excerpt from the Communiqué Issued Following the Council of Ministers' Meeting, European Action Plan
for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Fr. Embassy in U.K. (May 14, 2008), http:// www.ambafrance-
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uk.org/European-action-plan-for-SMEs.html.  
382. See Emery, supra note 246.  
383. Id.  
Footnote 
384. See, e.g., Funding and Services for Small Businesses in Finland, Nat'l Tech. Agency of Fin.,
http://www.tekes.fi/en/community/Small%20businesses/548/Small%20businesses/1420 (last visited Mar.
1,2010).  
385. See generally STRONG: Dutch SBIR Programme, Neth. Ministry of Econ. Affairs,
http://www.senternovem.nl/sbir/sbir_in_the_netherlands.asp (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) (announcing the Dutch
Government's intent to act as a "launching customer" for future high-tech SME suppliers with less than 100
employees).  
386. A typical SME Pact program operates through agreements between large prime contractors (especially
multinationals and government-owned defense firms), an SME trade association, and government contracting
agencies. These allegedly voluntary agreements are directed and monitored by top national leaders, such as
French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Under the SME Pact, large prime contractors are obligated to extend
research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) subcontracts to innovative SMEs and to fund one-third
of the total RDT&E cost (likely with flow-down procurement funds) while receiving supposedly non-procurement
funds from a national SME agency for another one-third of the total RDT&E cost. See Eric Jourdain, OSEO
&Comité Richelieu, The SME Pact: Growing Together, Presentation at INNO-Views Policy Workshop "Lead
Markets and Public Procurement: Joining Up to Foster Innovation," The Hague, Netherlands (July 3-8, 2008),
available at http://www.proinno-europe.eu/sites/default/files/2_3_WS05_Jourdain7913.pdf. SMEs assisted by
the French SME Pact R&D scheme can have up to euro100 million in turnover and up to 1,000 employees. See
Eric Jourdain, European Affairs, Comité Richelieu, SME Pact: General Overview, Presentation at the Turin Euro
Latin American Forum: Public-Private Partnerships for Knowledge-Based Regional Development, Turin, Italy
(Oct. 24-26, 2007), available at http://www.forurntorino.org/download.phpPfiieID-3 15&lang-en.  
387. Id. (citing the exemption for R&D procurements from the Public Procurement Directive, supra note 48, art.
16(f)).  
388. See, e.g., Petrou, supra note 63, at f 50 n.48.  
389. See EC, European Union Support Programs for SMEs: An Overview of Main Funding Opportunities
Available to European SMEs (Nov. 2008), available at. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/
entrepreneurship/docs/financing/sp_2 008_en.pdf (discussing R&D program cost reimbursement rules).  
Footnote 
390. EC, Strategy for a Stronger and More Competitive European Defense Industry, at recital 3.2.3, COM
(2007) 764 final (May 12, 2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0764:FIN:EN:PDF.  
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